Office of the Historian

36. Memorandum for the Record0

Washington, March 21, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Discussion of Laos at White House Meeting, March 21 (from notes by Mr. Nitze)1
1.
Mr. Rusk explained that, even if we move in, the object is not to fight a big war but to lay a foundation for negotiation. He said that the approach was “two-stringed,”—negotiation and action.
2.
The diplomatic moves are:
a.
Tell the British to modify their present position.
b.
Tell the Russians the seriousness of the US view, but that if the Russians were prepared to get the Pathet Lao to stop moving forward, thus creating a de facto cease-fire, then the British would be willing to meet in New Delhi with the Soviets as co-chairmen of the old Geneva Conference. This meeting in turn would lead to a 14-nation conference in which the US would participate. Concurrently, there should be negotiation for a settlement among the Lao political leaders.
3.
On the action side, the following steps were to be taken:
a.
British to agree to a SEATO force stationed in Thailand but not entering Laos for the time being.
b.
British to support an effort at the SEATO Conference to induce all other members to join.
c.
Sarit to be assured of our support.
d.
The US to move forward with all the 17 actions agreed at the White House recently,2 up to, but short of, the actual commitment of the B–26s and other forces.
e.
Congressional leaders to be told tomorrow the general plan.
f.
President to hold a press conference Thursday.
4.
Actions today:
a.
Rusk to talk to British and French here.
b.
Cables to New Delhi, Harriman, Nehru, etc.
c.
Cables to other SEATO members.
d.
Cable to Brown to inform Phoumi, and keep the King in Vientiane (i.e., not going back to Luang Prabang).
e.
Pentagon to take all preparatory steps indicated in the paper tabled at the meeting.3
5.
Remaining questions:
a.
What happens if the Russians don’t agree to a de facto cease-fire? It was suggested that in this event, we should persuade the British to support the SEATO action in any event and should prepare to execute the Millpond operation and go on from there.
William P. Bundy4
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 092 Laos 1961, Jan.–March. Top Secret.↩
  2. The meeting took place from 2:40 to 3:30 p.m. and was attended by the President, Vice President Johnson, McNamara, Burke, Nitze, Bowles, Parsons, Bohlen, Dulles, Bissell, Clifton, FitzGerald, McGeorge Bundy, Rostow, and Sorensen. It was characterized as “off the record.” (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book, Book I)↩
  3. See Document 26.↩
  4. Not found.↩
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩