Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

362. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, May 13, 1962, 4:50 p.m.

Present were: Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Attorney-General Kennedy, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Assistant Secretary Harriman, General Lemnitzer, General Taylor, Director McCone, Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Mr. Hilsman, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Kaysen and Mr. Forrestal.

The President asked to be brought up to date on the situation in Laos. Director McCone, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and Mr. Hilsman described developments in the past 24 hours.

The President requested that an intelligence estimate be prepared on the reaction of SEATO nations to a request from us for their cooperation in our proposed military moves in Thailand.¹ The President asked that in any press coverage, the question of our military intentions with respect to Laos be left open. The President desired to maintain vis-a-vis the Communist bloc an attitude of “veiled ambiguity”.

The President asked the Secretary of State to get the approval of the Thai Government to the proposed landings.² General Taylor suggested that an attempt be made by General Harkins, who is to be the Commander of the U.S. Forces in Thailand, to obtain from Marshal Sarit a promise of cooperation. The President asked that the Secretary of State get in touch with the Congressional leadership to inform them that he was planning to authorize the landing of American forces in Thailand.³

There followed a general discussion of the situation in Laos, the Secretary of State making the points that (a) General Phoumi should be replaced as a political figure by another personality such as Phoui Sananikone; (b) General Phoumi should revert to the role of purely military leader; and (c) military and economic aid should be given through other political personalities.

The President observed that since we have no confidence in Phoumi, we cannot and will not intervene in Laos in his behalf. The President also emphasized that we must get Sarit to realize that the events in Laos present more of a problem for the Thais than for us, and we are entitled to expect full cooperation from him.

The Attorney General suggested that an inventory be taken of the ways and means which are at our disposal to bring Phoumi under control.

The President said that all United States moves should be designed (a) to bring Phoumi to the conference table, and (b) to have the desired effect on the Soviets and on the Chinese.

The President asked whether American troops could have held Nam Tha under similar circumstances. General Lemnitzer replied that about three American battalions could have defended Nam Tha.

The President said that cables should go to Ambassadors Brown, Young and Nolting explaining the military movements.⁴ The Secretary of State observed that these military moves should be taken under the SEATO umbrella but that formal SEATO approval would not be requested at this time.

The President repeated that he wished to retain the element of reversibility in all military actions. He wanted no public announcement of landings until after he had ordered such landings. Furthermore, he wanted it again made clear to the Lao that we were undertaking no new commitment towards them.

The President said that he would consider whether to have another meeting the following day.⁵

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/17/62–5/25/62. Top Secret. Drafted by Forrestal on May 23. According to the President’s appointment book, this was the last meeting on Sunday, May 13, and no time for the conclusion is indicated. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)
1. The estimate was submitted by Hilsman to Rusk on May 15. Hilsman and INR, with FE’s approval, concluded that SEATO would not respond effectively to an RLG request for assistance, but a majority of SEATO members would support and even participate in U.S./Thai deterrent action. To implement U.S./Thai action without reference to SEATO would seriously weaken the organization, yet it would be difficult if not impossible to obtain SEATO endorsement. (Department of State, Central Files, 379/5–1562) The memorandum is included in vol. XXIII.
2. Documentation on the consultations with the Thai on the U.S. landings is ibid.
3. See Document 368.
4. In telegram 1747 to Bangkok, repeated to Vientiane as telegram 991, and to Moscow and CINCPAC POLAD, Rusk informed the recipients that the purpose of the U.S. troops’ movements to Thailand was to reinforce Thai morale and send a “message to Moscow that a major breach of the cease-fire could be dangerous business.” Phoumi must not interpret these moves as a commitment to him. The action was to be under general SEATO auspices and Rusk stated that it could be important to have “other SEATO flags flying in Thailand.” (Department of State, Central Files, 792.5/5–1462) For text, see vol. XXIII.
5. According to McCone’s account of this meeting, at its conclusion he transmitted a message [text not declassified] urging extreme care [text not declassified]. Agency personnel were not to [text not declassified] deviate from Washington policy. (Memorandum of the meeting, May 13, by McCone; Central Intelligence Agency Files: [text not declassified])