Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos⁰

Washington, May 12, 1962, 9:55 p.m.

987. Following cable represents policy decision taken by all U.S. Government agencies concerned and cleared at highest level:

For past year, U.S. policy Laos has been based on fundamental assumption that FAR was totally incompetent to prevent complete Communist over-running of Laos so long as Viet Minh units remained actively engaged. We have therefore concentrated our effort on international agreement which would provide for withdrawal Viet Minh and establishment provisional coalition government. Internal functions this government would be so constructed that friendly FAR units would, during government’s existence, control Mekong valley areas which are of greatest interest to U.S. and our allies. It has been our belief that FAR could assure security these areas if confronted only by PL and that eventual conservative-neutral political coalition in Laos could provide long-term assurance that they would not come under Communist control.

Nam Tha debacle is graphic demonstration of correctness our basic assumption. At same time, by breaching Mekong valley line, it deals dangerous blow against our eventual intentions.

No matter from what perspective this debacle is viewed, root cause rests with General Phoumi. His military disposition invited attack and conduct of his forces in Nam Tha area over past three months was not only inept but also provocative. He consistently disregarded MAAG advice and sum total his behavior, both with respect preparations for defense Nam Tha and complete rout his forces following enemy attack destroy any vestige of confidence we could place in him. Moreover, we have reports which raise suspicion that he might have deliberately invited a major engagement at Nam Tha and designed the subsequent planned retreat into Thailand to embarrass U.S. and call our hand on issue of military support for FAR. (We do not, of course suppose that he expected the forces placed at Nam Tha to be destroyed.)

Adding these considerations to facts that Phoumi has repeatedly gone back on his word, and that it has been Phoumi’s stubborn resistance in political field which has prevented international agreement that would have eliminated Viet Minh units from Laos (thereby avoid this debacle), we can only arrive at position of absolutely no confidence in Phoumi either politically or militarily. We believe our best interests would be served if he were eliminated entirely from Laotian scene. If there is any way in which that practicably can be done, we would welcome Embassy suggestions.

On assumption this immediate elimination not feasible, we nevertheless assume that, even among his most intimate associates Vientiane, confidence in Phoumi’s military performance has been shaken. We would assume also that, in Vientiane political circles, there must be many who would be susceptible to argument that Phoumi badly needs attend to his military knitting and cease spending so much time in political field. Therefore, we believe current moment most opportune time move rapidly to bring Phoumi under control and to diminish his central influence within RLG in such manner that he can gradually be removed as power factor.

Our first steps should be directed toward (a) his removal from active ministerial position in RLG in order return full time to function as FAR military commander, and (b) his functioning in military capacity only in accordance with and under direct MAAG guidance, (c) as complete reorganization of government as possible suggested Embassy 1534.¹

We believe we have direct leverage effect such changes at this time not only because of shaken confidence which we assume in Vientiane, but also because of Phoumi’s patent desire obtain MAAG assistance repatriate and re-equip his routed elite battalions. Consequently following measures should be taken forthwith:

A. It should be made known to all significant political and military figures in Laos that we consider Phoumi personally responsible for Nam Tha defeat involving destruction of fighting capacity his best battalions, and that we have completely lost confidence in his ability and reliability in both the political military fields.

B. Phoumi personally should be told (by Chief MAAG) in elaborate detail exactly what we believe he did wrong and how we consider his deliberate disregarding MAAG advice was, either wittingly or unwittingly, basic cause Nam Tha rout.

C. In political field, steps should be taken rapidly to follow up and encourage proposals for reorganization RLG in such fashion that Phoumi reverts to military commander’s position and ceases be central political figure.

D. Taking advantage Phoumi’s desire have military transport for his routed troops plus military reequipment of these units, MAAG should drive hard bargain with him, making certain that these desires are satisfied only when we receive satisfaction that Phoumi will accept and follow U.S. military advice. This satisfaction should involve first and foremost understanding that Phoumi will drop ministerial functions and revert full time status as military commander. Additional elements of bargain should involve arrangements for most intimate consultation at all levels, redressing those military dispositions which MAAG considers inept, and assurance that MAAG in effect controls Phoumi’s military movements.

[1 paragraph (2–½ lines of source text) not declassified]

Sum total these moves, plus any other which Embassy may suggest, will be effort bring Phoumi both politically and militarily under wraps. This effort will be pursued as undeviating policy objective parallel with our continuing fundamental policy of attempting (a) to restore cease-fire, (b) to establish coalition government and (c) to put Geneva Agreements into effect.

Any U.S. military activity which may be undertaken as result recent events northern Laos must not be interpreted by Laotians as indication that U.S. rushing to support Phoumi. On contrary, this activity represents measure our concern for security Thailand and also for Viet Nam. Our future attitude towards RLG will depend upon degree their military and political cooperation with us. In particular, RLG and FAR must understand necessity being properly responsive our MAAG.

We have sent first-class, well qualified military officers and men to Laos who have based their advice to FAR upon practical military experience. Not only because U.S. Government is bearing entire cost equipping FAR but also because U.S. prestige is invested in FAR conduct, we cannot continue to tolerate situations in which FAR capriciously loses its military equipment, scatters its best fighting units and generally incubates fiascos by willfully ignoring MAAG guidance. From now on, Chief MAAG should make major issue over every instance in which advice ignored or rejected; and, if situation persists, should inform Washington by full report of circumstances, specifying FAR personnel responsible.

Foregoing expression of U.S. attitude towards irresponsible military and political conduct RLG is not unique with U.S., but is shared by most free world nations who have serious interest in welfare Kingdom and people of Laos, as well as security Southeast Asia.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Sullivan; cleared by Forrestal, Harriman, and McNamara; and approved by Rusk. Repeated niact to Bangkok and CINCPAC for POLAD, and to Moscow.
1. Document 353.