Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

368. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, May 15, 1962, 9:15 a.m.

Meeting with Congressional Leaders

Present were: The President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Assistant Secretary Harriman, Director McCone, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy and Mr. Forrestal; and the Democratic and Republican leadership of the Senate and the House as per list attached.¹

The President opened the meeting by expressing concern over the deterioration in Laos and its possible effect on Thailand and stated that the purpose of the meeting was to explain moves decided upon in interests of meeting our commitments to Thailand.

Secretary McNamara described the Nam Tha military action indicating about 6,000 RLG troops involved versus about 5,000 PL. The RLG artillery performed well until ordered destroyed, and RLG forces retired in orderly fashion with their small arms intact. The Secretary pointed out how the Laotian generals had acted against the advice of Generals Boyle and Tucker in a number of respects: they put six or seven battalions in Nam Tha against the two which were recommended by the Americans. These forces occupied the low ground, not the high ground. When the forces were defeated, it was the Laotian generals who were the first to leave. The Laotian soldiers themselves had performed better than on some occasions in the past, but their leadership had been very bad. Now their combat effectiveness was estimated by General Tucker as nil, and they had retreated clear back across the Mekong, far outdistancing any pursuit.

Director McCone reported the overall Laotian military situation, pointing out that Communists held entire eastern section of the country from north to south. RLG held western portion. Referring to the map, Director McCone stated that previously deployed Pathet Lao military capability could take over Thakheh, Saravane or Attopeu. The PL controlled the Mekong River in the vicinity Pak Beng and were strengthening their position in Luang Prabang. We therefore conceded to the PL the capability of maintaining actions of Nam Tha intensity in several locations with a probability of success. Nevertheless, we did not expect an all out military move until Communists had assessed U.S. intentions.

Senator Russell asked relative strength of Communist forces versus RLG; Director McCone answered that RLG forces totaled 76,000, Communist forces numbered 38,000, but the Communists were more effective fighters, better led, and possessed a greater will to fight. General Lemnitzer pointed out that the Pathet Lao were stiffened by Viet Minh troops, and that this in his judgment made the difference. Senator Russell asked whether the enemy forces were better equipped than ours. General Lemnitzer said that they were not, in general, though in certain specific cases they might have an advantage.

Secretary Rusk then reviewed the political situation, stating that the Geneva and Vienna agreements incorporated guarantees against intrusion of foreign troops into Laos—the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos, and the maintenance of a neutral Laos. Secretary Rusk stated that the Lao do not have the will nor the capacity to be a military power and if foreign troops are withdrawn, the area should be peaceful. Following the establishment of a Souvanna Phouma government, elections will take place and Secretary Rusk predicted victory over the Pathet Lao. Secretary Rusk said it was not clear that Nam Tha meant the breakdown in the cease-fire. He stated that Phoumi was now willing to talk and seemed more reasonable than before. Secretary Rusk emphasized it is quite possible that nothing will come out of the negotiations. Moscow is committed to the Geneva/Vienna arrangements but the extent of Moscow influence on Peiping and Hanoi is not clear.

Meanwhile, Secretary Rusk continued, we are much concerned over Thailand. Thailand has a long common border with Laos, and the sensitive situation in Northeast Thailand combined to create a situation in which the fall of Nam Tha has shaken the confidence of the Thais. But there is a need for some encouragement to the Thais, and it is largely for this reason that we are now recommending some build up in the forces in Thailand. We are also planning to seek the support of certain SEATO countries in this undertaking. Secretary Rusk then turned the discussion over to the Secretary of Defense.

Secretary McNamara reviewed his meeting with Marshal Sarit² and outlined the dangers of the exposed border, and then explained in detail the planned troop deployment in Thailand. He said that this build up of force would lead to a total level of about 8,000 Americans.

In responding to a question from Senator Wiley about the Allied role in these activities, the President took up the discussion and remarked that in this whole area our difficulty had been a shortage of Allied support. When we found in Laos earlier that our position had no clear Allied support, we moved toward negotiations. These had been complicated in turn by the fact that Phoumi appeared to wish us to be pulled into a fight. His pushing of large forces to the north appeared almost like a kind of encampment. Now we could not expect much help from anyone: the Paks had problems, the French were obviously unwilling, the British might be more helpful.

The President then stated that we are for a cease-fire now as we were a year ago and favored a coalition government because military action by the RLG seemed ineffective and furthermore the British and the French would not go along with military action. The President explained that the Geneva agreements were more favorable to us than we had hoped and that Phoumi had opposed them because he hoped the U.S. would intervene militarily. The President explained the British and French are violently opposed to Phoumi; and that Plan 5 is no longer valid because of the attitude of the British and the French and the military impotence of the RLG. Therefore our policy is to seek a coalition government, otherwise there is a danger that the entire country can be taken over militarily by the Communists. The President stated that Khrushchev has shown no interest in the situation. The President then stated that in his opinion Phoumi had been wrong all these months and that the chances of maintaining an independent Laos were not good today. The President said that he will not order U.S. military forces into Laos without further exhaustive study and consultation with Congressional leaders.

The Secretary of State commented briefly on the dilemma of “pressure” on Phoumi. On the one hand we were eager to get him to shift his position, but on the other hand we did not wish to destroy him by withdrawing all support at a time when we are still dependent upon such forces as he can muster. The Secretary also remarked that it was important to maintain the ambiguity of the decision we were now taking, because we wish to get whatever political leverage there might be out of a possible belief by others that we might be ready to act in Laos.

Senator Wiley asked whether this concentration of attention on Laos might not mean that we were being sucked into a diversionary play. To him it seemed that the situations in Berlin, Africa, and in Cuba itself were more important. Was there certainty that we were focusing on the right problems? The Secretary of State responded that he thought we should be watchful on all fronts, and he brought the leadership up to date briefly on the state of the Berlin negotiations.

Senator Dirksen asked whether we were planning to restore economic assistance to the Laotian government. The President replied that for the present it was felt that they could get along with their own overseas reserves of some $18 million held in London, and that there was no plan at the moment to restore economic assistance at once.

Senator Dirksen asked why American intelligence was not clear whether in fact there had been Chinese Communist battalions in the attack on Nam Tha. Director McCone replied that there was simply no evidence available to the Americans of any such Chinese Communist battalions, in spite of Thai reports to this effect. We have tried as hard as we know how to pin down the facts here, and there remains no evidence of Chinese Communist participation.

Senator Russell asked the Secretary of Defense why our engineers should be engaged in building Siamese roads, and Secretary McNamara replied that he did not believe that we should use U.S. personnel, on a permanent basis, for road-building in South Asia. The Speaker asked whether South Koreans might be used in Southeast Asia. The Secretary of State remarked that it would be better for them to stay where they were, if there were going to be any serious test in that part of the world.

In answer to Representative Arend’s question, General Lemnitzer stated that the Thais had four divisions and three regimental combat teams well equipped by the United States but under strength—60% to 70%. These troops are well trained, but their will to fight remains questionable and will only be known when it is actually tested.

Senator Humphrey questioned Secretary McNamara concerning cooperation with our MAAG’s. Secretary McNamara reported that in Laos cooperation was poor—so much so that we were refused maps and information on their order of battle. Cooperation was considerably better, but not perfect, in Thailand; and it was excellent in South Vietnam.

Senator Russell and Senator Saltonstall questioned our ability to remove the MAAG and other American personnel in Laos in event the country is overrun and General Lemnitzer answered that this has been provided for.

Senator Humphrey asked what control we have over the situation in Laos. Secretary McNamara replied that we have a lever of military support and a threat of withholding of it and that the incident at Nam Tha increases our influence. General Tucker reported that the situation in this respect was now better. Senator Humphrey asked whether we could do what we were doing in South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara replied that in Laos the situation just would not be as good. The Secretary of State remarked that the troops in South Vietnam really fight and that this is quite a crucial difference. Senator Russell expressed uncomplimentary views of the quality of the Laotian armed forces. Senator Kuchel asked under what obligations we were moving in Thailand. Secretary Rusk answered that we had both multilateral and bilateral commitments here. This was a precautionary movement of forces, and not a movement which could rest formally on either paragraph 4(1) or 4(2) of the SEATO Treaty. Senator Dirksen asked what we would do “if it caves in Laos.” The President replied we would then try to hold in Thailand. Senator Saltonstall asked about Cambodia, and the President replied that this was a neutral area but not one which appeared immediately and sharply threatened.

The meeting adjourned at 10:00 o’clock.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos, 5/17/62–5/25/62. Top Secret. Drafted by Forrestal on May 23. McGeorge Bundy drafted a memorandum of this discussion on May 21. He asked Forrestal to incorporate his version into a memorandum for the record, which apparently is the memorandum printed here. (Ibid.)
1. Not attached.
2. A memorandum of this conversation is printed in volume XXIII.