367. Editorial Note
On May 14, the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in SNIE 58–4–62, entitled “The Current Military Situation and Outlook in Laos,” prepared by the intelligence community and submitted by the Central Intelligence Agency. It provided an update of the military and political situation and sought to estimate Communist intentions. The estimate confirmed that the Nam Tha rout had broken the back of Royal Lao Government resistance in the north. Among the eight battalions involved were three of Phoumi’s best paratrooper units. Their morale was shattered, their combat effectiveness was nil, and they would have to be retrained, re-equipped, and regrouped. The estimate stated: “We believe that the Laotian Army is not capable of resisting a determined enemy attack anywhere in the country.”
Assessing the prospects for the Royal Lao Government, the estimate concluded that while there was little chance that the government was capable of mustering strength to overcome its military and political reverses, no real opposition to Phoumi had emerged. The fact that Phoumi was on his good will tour of Asian capitals during most of the crisis could help to absolve him of blame for the defeat. Nevertheless, the estimate did not rule out an attempt within the army or government to decrease Phoumi’s influence.
The estimate stated that the attack in the north was calculated, well-planned, and almost certainly concurred in by the leaders in Mosow, Hanoi, and Peking. It was designed to take advantage of a local tactical opportunity. The attack did not, in the view of the intelligence community, mark the beginning of the Communist military conquest of all of Laos, but probably was seen as means of enhancing their position at the bargaining table. Nonetheless, the estimate stated that the Communist forces would follow up their successes with a consolidation of all their control of north and northeast Laos and could encircle Luang Prabang, threaten Sayaboury Province, and seize Saravane and Attopeu, thus consolidating their hold on the overland route between North and South Vietnam. For the time being, the major towns along the Mekong would not be attacked. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Laos 381)