Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

342. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative’s Naval Aide (Bagley) to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)⁰

Washington, May 4, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Laos Summary

1. Ambassador Young and Foreign Minister Thanat have conversed in Bangkok¹ as a follow-up to the Phoumi-Sarit talks.² Thanat confirmed the list of assurances Phoumi is seeking (Def/Int Troika; fair distribution of other portfolios; resume US economic aid; US guarantee against Commie pressures) but broadened the question of a US guarantee. The Thais desire that assurance of US action in case a coalition government is endangered by Communist pressure be a matter of clear understanding between the United States and Thailand as well as Laos. Thanat in general was in ill humor and suggested that if the Geneva agreements were finally approved there was some question whether Thailand would sign the Accords.

2. Ambassador Young asked that he be advised as to the Washington reaction to the Phoumi-Sarit agreement and Thanat talk for use in a forthcoming meeting with Sarit. A reply has been prepared and will probably be transmitted late today.³ It indicates: (1) the US has no intention of giving a firm military guarantee, but reiterates the oft-repeated intention to give a coalition government as much support as possible, (2) Thanat’s remarks on the Geneva Accords border on the absurd and Ambassador Young is not to discuss this subject with the Thais for the time being, and (3) resumption of economic aid will depend on Phoumi’s acting on his professed desire to talk with Souvanna on a new basis.

3. State is taking action in Paris to urge Souvanna to make a positive reply to the Phoumi proposal which, I assume, would include returning to Vientiane.⁴ Souvanna so far has merely indicated that his representatives in Vientiane, who in his and Kong Le’s absence are all PL, will consider the Phoumi proposals and send recommendations to Souvanna. Souvanna is now complaining of a new ailment, aching teeth, which in conjunction with the June marriage of his daughter probably means he will be very reluctant to depart from the pleasures of France.

4. State has sent a telegram to Moscow for Gromyko, in Secretary Rusk’s name, saying our pressures on Phoumi are progressing satisfactorily, but suggesting we are less than satisfied with PL activities around Nam Tha and Muong Sing.⁵ This is the first time State has felt able to put some of the negotiating pressure, with a straight face, on the Soviets.

5. Unless and until these related actions in Bangkok, Vientiane, Paris and Moscow bring Souvanna and Phoumi together, things will drag on as they have in the past. Military sanctions involving White Star teams will be held in abeyance until Phoumi proves his sincerity, and will be used as a continuing means to keep the Thais active in our behalf.

WHB

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos 7, T–028–69. Secret. Taylor’s initials appear on the source text.
1. See footnote 2, Document 339.
2. See Document 337.
3. See footnote 6, Document 340.
4. In telegrams 5129, 5138, and 5179 from Paris, May 1, 2, and 4, Charge Cecil B. Lyon reported that as instructed he had meetings with Souvanna on the morning of May 1 and the evening of May 3. In addition, Lyon had passed a message to the Lao Charge in Paris for Souvanna stating that Phoumi desired to renew consultations on a coalition and was prepared to abandon the RLG claim to Defense and Interior, given certain assurances. Lyon or Anthony C. Swezey, a long-time friend of Souvanna, were prepared to act as an intermediary between Phoumi and Souvanna. In the second conversation, Lyon encouraged Souvanna to meet directly with Phoumi and not act through his colleagues in Khang Khay. Lyon thought that Souvanna was definitely interested in an exchange of views with Phoumi. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–162, 751J.00/5–262, and 751J.00/5–462)
5. Rusk (who was on an extended foreign trip) initiated the idea of a personal message to Gromyko in Secto 16 from Athens, May 3. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–362) The message, which was approved by Rusk, informed Gromyko that the United States, supported by the British, French, and Thais, had pressed Phoumi very strongly to join in responsible discussions on a coalition government under Souvanna. The United States was now encouraged to think that more realistic negotiations were likely to resume. The recent military moves by the Pathet Lao in Nam Tha and Muong Sing could endanger progress. Rusk hoped Gromyko would use his influence with Souphanouvong to prevent aggressive action by the Pathet Lao. (Telegram 89 to Athens, May 3, and Secto 72 from Athens, May 6; ibid., 751J.00/5–362 and 751J.00/5–662)