Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

337. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State⁰

Bangkok, May 1, 1962, 7 p.m.

1691. PriMin has given me following report on agreement reached with RLG which he asked me convey quickly to President. Sarit is convinced he has gotten firm assurances from Boun Oum and Phoumi to go along with President’s position outlined in aide-memoire I submitted to Sarit.¹

Following is gist Sarit-Phoumi understanding and Sarit’s commentary:

(1) Phoumi and Boun Oum agreed to work on tripartite formula among RLG, US and Souvanna Phouma along these lines: (a) RLG accepts Souvanna Phouma as PriMin govt national union; (b) RLG and Souvanna accept troika principle for Defense and Interior Ministries but only for these Ministries; (c) Souvanna accepts cabinet divided among 4 elements of 4 each and gives assurances against letting PL-VM take over Laos; (d) if prior agreement reached with Souvanna and Americans, RLG and King will undertake have National Assembly vote full powers to King who as face-saver will then reaffirm mandate to Souvanna Phouma to form national union govt on this basis. Phoumi promised Sarit that May 10 Assembly meeting would not do anything drastic and would be formality. Sarit and Thanat are concerned over how to guarantee King in (fact) does reaffirm mandate, and believe US should cover this; (e) USG assigns US representative first to work out this formula with RLG particularly re mandate for Souvanna and then be present or available while talks are conducted with Souvanna Phouma before or after May 11. Phoumi also wants us to help persuade Souvanna Phouma return immediately to Vientiane after above has been conveyed to him by American side and also by RLG.

(2) Sarit and Thanat propose following to USG in order fulfill above Sarit-Phoumi pledge: (a) Time is of essence and right actions must be taken immediately; (b) Sarit hopes US will agree to send representative (possibly Sullivan) to Vientiane immediately and also take matter up simultaneously with Souvanna in Paris as soon as possible. Sarit hopes Souvanna and US representative would arrive in Vientiane at approximately same time before May 11. If this were to work out, Phoumi says he will cut short his foreign visits and return to Vientiane. Or US rep could meet him in Saigon. Precautions must be taken with Souvanna to keep him from making statements which would upset applecart; (c) Agreement with Phoumi is very sensitive and closely held. It must be treated with greatest caution by all of us to avoid any possible leak or reference to it publicly in this delicate interim period until it is underway; (d) Sarit recommends that USG resume financial payments as soon as possible after agreement between RLG and Souvanna Phouma firm. This would be principal face-saver for RLG after USG can be assured they make good for their part; (e) USG can accept Sarit’s own assurance Phoumi and Boun Oum accept Sarit’s advice that they would not defy USG and go it alone and should get back on good terms with Americans; (f) Sarit believes RLG has valid concern over whether or not Souvanna Phouma as PriMin would be able or willing enough to prevent Communists from taking over country. Phoumi wants and is entitled to satisfactory assurances from Souvanna. Therefore, Sarit recommends USG assurances to RLG and specifically to Gen. Phoumi be made part of general understanding as safeguard for contingency Souvanna cannot or does not live up to his bargain. US assurance would be promised on Gen. Phoumi carrying out pledge by RLG to Sarit and Americans. Sarit said he had to bear down with our oral and written assurances about Gen. Phoumi’s role in order convince him make “concessions”.

(3) As to circumstances and atmosphere of these Bangkok talks, Sarit said they were long, difficult but satisfactory in conclusion. He finally saw Phoumi alone with only Gen. Wallop present and obtained personal pledge from Phoumi which in customary Southeast Asian manner Sarit considers unbreakable. He assured me of this several times. But he had to use much persuasion, pressure and even threats of a vague kind to get this pledge. He based his case point by point lay down of our aide-memoire which was timely and helpful. Phoumi and RLG mission now see Lao problem much better. As in Thai proverb, they came like frogs thinking their little pond was big sea; now they return knowing whole ocean.

In initial three hour session Sarit’s pressure for political compromise with Souvanna came as great shock to RLG mission. They returned speechless to guest house and could not eat lunch. Phoumi wept. It took additional sessions and much pressure to bring them around but only Boun Oum and Phoumi are in on final agreement with Sarit. While other members of RLG Cabinet may know now, Sarit emphasized initial secretness of understandings. Americans must realize much more than they have that Phoumi needs face-saving not only in public but with most of RLG. Sarit claims that it is other ministers who are pressing Phoumi not to agree with Americans or deal with Souvanna Phouma. Phoumi is afraid of appearing to them as surrendering to Thais and to Americans, and considers Americans hold him solely responsible for intransigence which he considers untrue and unjust. Sarit agreed with him.

As to Thai aid, Sarit said he had to concede a little help as part of his effort to bring them around successfully. They asked for free gifts of rice, sugar and salt, and credits for cement, [garble] and construction materials. Sarit said he could provide a little of some but nothing of others. If American financial aid restored, this matter would be disposed of. Then Thanat asked me point-blank if I thought USG would agree to above formula and restore aid. I replied that I could not answer with certainty but that there might be a chance if this all worked out in good faith. Thanat said it was very important for PriMin to know as soon as possible USG’s reaction to this tentative agreement as well as to possibility of restoring its aid under acceptable conditions. He emphasized that his tentative agreement depended on all three parts working out in mutuality and good timing. As Thanat put it, this is all “a big troika around a little troika.”

Comment: I believe Sarit’s report is honest and complete. It checks in general with what Sisouk and Wallop have told me separately and privately during past few days as well as with other indications here in Bangkok. However in the case of some points it is not clear whether it is Sarit or Phoumi who is proposer.

I recommend that we respond affirmatively and quickly but define carefully with Sarit and Phoumi what is meant by assurances in (f) above. Sarit has in mind US political and military support for Phoumi group if coalition fails. Also under what circumstances we would restore financial aid. I strongly recommend that President send personal message of appreciation to PriMin and ForMin for time, care and persistence which they have shown in developing this tentative agreement.²

Young

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated niact to Paris and Vientiane, priority to London, and to Geneva Fecon.
1. See Document 333.
2. See footnote 2, Document 340.