Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

333. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State⁰

Bangkok, April 23, 1962, 6 p.m.

1642. Re Deptels 1601, 1603,¹ 1604,² 1610.³

Saw Sarit this morning to carry out instructions and convey reftels. Thanat was present with Sarit’s aides Gens Chalermchai and Eksakdi. Dollison of Embassy accompanied me.

I first orally gisted President’s reply to King’s letter, stressing need for negotiated settlement, danger of RLG obstruction leading to resumption of hostilities and unavoidable Pathet Lao capture of Laos, necessity of coalition, neutral govt with Souvanna Premiership and implementation Geneva Accords, importance of withdrawal of outside mil forces, inability of USG to continue financial and mil measures in Laos which support courses contrary to commitment publicly undertaken by Royal Govt, difficulty justifying US mil intervention if reasonable peaceful solution forfeited, and hope Royal Govt will adopt truly realistic attitude and enter serious negotiations. Then conveyed paras 1–4 Deptel 1603 and first two paras of 1601.

At that point I hit hard on dangerous implications of Phoumi’s May 11 date if it threw Souvanna out of picture. I said USG seeking to persuade RLG and Phoumi not take sharp, irrevocable act at that time. USG strongly hoped PriMin and ForMin would use their considerable influence and counsel with RLG good will mission shortly due Bangkok to win them over. Thanat translated this and whole presentation fully and correctly.

Thanat then stated that letter to King and oral statement to him seemed general and even vague regarding arrangements for political settlement and particularly safeguards against Commie takeover on Souvanna failure.

I then explained I wished to convey additional points to Sarit on instructions from highest level USG and read paras numbered one and two of Deptel 1601. As to para three of Deptel 1601, I made it separate item stressing its highly sensitive top secret nature, in view of Deptel 1607.⁴ Repeating USG concern over May 11 date, said USG prepared to take action in sphere mil sanctions in Laos by end of first week of May if RLG not persuaded to change its course by then. Thanat asked if this meant withdrawal of mil support to RLG. I replied that sanctions were still unspecified, but USG would have to take some action along these lines if Phoumi by May 7 indicated he intended proceed despite our representations and Thai efforts. I added my govt was therefore most anxious that face-saving solution be found before any such sharp action by US would be required. I explained further that it seemed as if Phoumi was bent on irrevocable action which would shatter Laotian negotiations like glass and produce irrevocable consequences. While I stressed the sensitive nature of this deadline date for possible USG action, I am reasonably certain that this third point in Deptel 1601 will get back to Lao Govt either through direct Thai channels or when good will mission here this week. It made full impression on Sarit and Thanat who translated it accurately, colorfully and vigorously.

Reactions of Sarit and Thanat to above presentation as follows: (a) Sarit asked for text or summary of President’s letter, oral statement, and my instructions, for him to use Wed. morning when Lao good will mission calls on him.⁵ Thanat suggested wrap up in aide-memoire, which I will promptly prepare and send over to him and PriMin. Sarit remarked that, after hearing extensive US Govt comments, he would have more to say to Lao mission than they would to him; (b) both Sarit and Thanat hoped US Govt would understand RTG must see Lao mission as gesture of courtesy and protocol, although they have yet no specific indication from Laos as to what mission expects propose or receive. Sarit again stated officially for USG that RTG is in no position and does not intend to agree to meeting any requests from mission for assistance. Thai role will be limited to listening and persuading; (c) Sarit asked me to be sure my govt understood none of us should expect satisfactory rest from efforts at persuasion, his, or ours or others. In fact he seemed to indicate that this whole diplomatic effort to bring RLG around may well fail. According Sarit, Lao Govt appears to have gone “wild”. They have even spoken of turning country into “absolute monarchy”. Thanat relayed he had received written report which indicated an arrangement along such lines with three Royal Deputies, Boun Oum, Souvanna and Souphanouvong. Thanat added that Lao officials in very difficult, obstructive mood, and do not understand situation at all. They have “one-track mind”, not using their heads. Sarit commented they are all “old fashioned” with no telephones or radios (sic) and do not know what is going on in outside world or their own country; (d) Sarit emphasized to me again his reports indicate King of Laos and Souvanna Phouma remain on very bad personal terms. This is one of major reasons why Souvanna coalition is so difficult to bring about quickly or perhaps at all. Thanat also stressed this “formidable” hurdle in our joint efforts; (e) Sarit vigorously subscribed to objective of getting outside military forces removed from Laos under Geneva Accords and internal settlement. However, he remains skeptical that Chinese Communists can be negotiated or persuaded out, particularly in light of their building roads and other installations in northeast Laos, where Communists have been for over ten years without any effective way found to dislodge them. He added comment, once foreign forces withdrew, Laos would be no threat to neighbors.

Sarit and Thanat listened carefully my presentation and discussed above matters in forthright and forthcoming way. Sarit did try to explain to me that he was avoiding newspaper questions on Laos as much as he possibly could. When he cannot he said he had to answer indirectly [garble] he hoped we understood.

Am spending Monday evening with Thanat and Wallop on details.

Young

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2362. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated priority to Vientiane.
1. Documents 331 and 332.
2. Telegram 1604 to Bangkok, sent also to Vientiane as telegram 905, contained the text of the President’s letter to King Savang; for a summary, see footnote 3, Document 326.
3. In telegram 1610, April 20, the Department suggested that Young use the occasion of his April 23 meeting with Sarit to make the points outlined in Document 331. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2062)
4. In telegram 1607, April 20, the Department warned that military sanctions on the RLG “must be closely held” as premature disclosure to Laos or others would dissipate the effect and could endanger personnel. (Ibid.)
5. Prince Boun Oum and Phoumi arrived in Thailand on Tuesday, April 24, seeking support for their position in Laos. The “good will mission” continued to Malaya, Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam in search of support.