Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

331. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos⁰

Washington, April 19, 1962, 8:15 p.m.

903. Joint State/Defense Message.

Following represents decision highest level USG and constitutes instructions for dealing with current phase Laos developments.

Our policy continues to be directed toward achieving Souvanna solution and Geneva settlement. Our current efforts have not only reassured our British and French allies but have probably helped hold back Communist side from rash military actions. Therefore we are prepared to undertake further prudent pressures on Phoumi toward realizing our objectives.

Current Thai efforts with Phoumi have so far not produced any changes in attitude on his part. Moreover he continues to press forward on his King’s government scheme which if initiated on May 11 could have effect of revoking Souvanna’s mandate or otherwise driving him from scene. Therefore we cannot afford inaction at this juncture.

For Bangkok: You should seek special meeting with Thanat and Sarit and urge them to make more vigorous effort to:

1. Persuade Phoumi and his supporters to resume negotiations with other two factions along following lines: renunciation of their claim to exclusive control over Defense and Interior provided that (a) some acceptable arrangements along lines of troika in Defense and Interior are made, (b) Souphanouvong gives definite assurances he will not attempt extend his military positions during interim period as he is apparently doing.

2. Thais must persuade Phoumi not to pursue his King’s government scheme in any way which will revoke Souvanna’s mandate or drive him from scene.

3. You should inform Thais that in view our concern over dangers inherent in Phoumi’s proposed actions on May 11 we are prepared impose unspecified military sanctions on him by May 7 if Thais have not succeeded before then.

For Vientiane: President has approved use if necessary of military sanction of withdrawal White Star Teams which currently in forward areas. (We understand there are 7 or 8.) Teams would be withdrawn to rear echelon and would remain in Laos until expiration their normal duty tours. Replacement would depend upon developments. In consultation with your military advisers you should prepare plans and recommendations for implementation this sanction. End for Vientiane.

Department will inform British and French in Washington of foregoing including time limit we have given Thais. However stressing Souphanouvong’s refusal to give satisfactory assurances in military field, we will advise them confidentially that we will limit our sanctions for time being to withdrawal of White Star Teams from certain forward field units. We will urge active British effort to obtain concrete assurances from Souphanouvong against military actions. If indications warrant we would attempt encourage bilateral meetings between Souphanouvong and Phoumi designed to stabilize military situation and provide some form military modus vivendi.

We are also considering possibility of seeking agreement with Soviets on level of military equipment we and they are delivering to our respective clients in Laos with purpose testing them and avoiding escalation.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1962. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Cross; cleared in draft by Harriman, Sullivan, and Forrestal; cleared in substance with Heinz of DOD/ISA and David H. Henry, Deputy Director of SOV; and approved by Koren. Sent also priority to Bangkok as telegram 1601. Repeated to London, Paris, Geneva for Fecon, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Moscow, and CINCPAC POLAD.