334. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State0
I delivered President’s letter to King at 1000 April 23. He did not read it in my presence. I therefore immediately made points contained Deptel 904, adding at end of point 3, the hope that nothing would be done which would have the effect of revoking Souvanna’s mandate.
King nodded comprehension after each of the sentences contained in point 1. His expression indicated skepticism with respect to all but third sentence of point 2. He showed no particular reaction to points 3 and 4.
HM expressed appreciation for President’s letter and message. He said he would study the letter carefully. He said he believed he fully understood President’s position and would convey it to the Govt (who landed in LP about a half hour after I did). He would inform the Govt of the President’s letter and urge them to consider it carefully, to be wise in their decisions and to act in a manner calculated to regain US help. He indicated that he had been anxious to get the President’s letter before receiving the Govt.
HM said that he must always act as a constitutional monarch. Lao leaders on both sides were involved in a considerable amount of dishonesty. If he got into politics and supported either side he would be supporting dishonesty. The three Princes were working for themselves, each supported by a different foreign power, and were acting in a spirit of rivalry, not of patriotism. People in north could not accept Boun Oum and south would never accept Souvanna. Result of a continuation of this state of affairs would be a division of the country.
Solution of this problem would be a govt of national union. King favors this solution. So do most responsible Lao. Such a govt would probably be headed by Souvanna. That was why King had given Souvanna his mandate to try to form a responsible govt. Such a govt should be a govt of elite. Souvanna, however, had simply presented a list of names of non-entities who had followed him to Xieng Khouang and Boun Oum had done the same in his list. During discussions in Vientiane each side stuck to their hangers-on. Even if a govt were [Page 703] formed of people like that it would not work and the people would not support it. The King could not make such a govt work.
The tragedy of Laos was that it had so few competent people and these would not cooperate. Much US aid had been used for personal gain, although Laos had still benefitted greatly from it. The internal problems of Laos were largely due to the failure of the Lao themselves. If the three Princes persisted as they were doing, he saw no solution. Even the King might go, voluntarily or involuntarily.
I said a considerable body of opinion seemed to feel that a govt under the King was the solution and that he might be asked by the National Congress in May to form such a govt. He said, “We will see.”
At another point in the conversation he said, “We will know much more after May 11.” It was time for the Assembly to take some responsibility. He would put it up to them and see what they would do. My efforts to get King to explain these cryptic remarks further and to clarify his position on accepting full powers only elicited the statement, made with emotion, that if the National Assembly gave him full powers it would be an act of “great cowardice.”
At one point the King said that he wished he could be the master of his own decisions.
King said that Chinese would never abandon their imperialism. They might talk peaceful coexistence but they would continue to support wars of “liberation.” Hence Laos would always be under attack. Communist China would never believe in peaceful overtures of the US no matter how sincere they were.
HM said that if the RLG decided to abandon US support that would be their decision and their responsibility.
Comment: Throughout the interview, HM was extremely friendly and gave every indication that he fully understood the nature and firmness of the President’s position.
I believe that HM will bring the President’s letter to the attention of the RLG today. In view of his consistent sympathy for Phoumi’s position, how far he will go in urging Phoumi to follow the President’s advice I cannot predict, although HM seemed to indicate more than usual concern about the loss of US aid and the possible results of the impasse reached by the Princes. In any event, however, I fear that Phoumi and his colleagues have dug themselves so far into their position that the changes of their modifying it substantially remain slight. Although I gained the distinct impression that the King was trying to tell me without specifically saying so that he would not agree to heading a Royal Govt, I still felt that this possibility cannot be excluded if he were actually confronted by a concrete action by the National Congress. [Page 704] HM on this occasion seemed considerably and genuinely concerned about the possibility of partition.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2362. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok.↩
- Document 332.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 326.↩