Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

343. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Among the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Acting Secretary of State Ball, and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)⁰

Washington, May 6, 1962, 10:15 a.m.

Ball told Bundy there was an artillery barrage on Nam Tha early this morning and an infantry attack which has come into the town. There were two of a special force training team of 12 officers and men who were in Nam Tha but were taken out by helicopter. They don’t think there are any other Americans in there. The boys have their track shoes on and they are moving southwest.¹

Johnson said there has been nothing so far as he has seen in the last week or so that would stimulate this. It is his impression that there has been less than the usual picking at each other and this comes on the heels of Phoumi’s move to Souvanna. This move he has taken at the moment is of course very bothersome. This is the first clear open breach of the cease-fire. There is no arguing about that. Phoumi has been reinforcing Nam Tha against our advice. But this is no excuse for their attacking. It was foolish on his part.

Bundy asked if there was much more than these first two reports.² Johnson said there was something coming in to the War Room from the MAAG. They haven’t got it all yet but we should have it shortly. We should have more in the way of details in the next thirty minutes or so. Bundy said they had sent the earlier despatches down to Palm Beach but he has not heard from the President. Bundy asked if Ball was thinking of calling him—or shouldn’t they wait until we know more. Ball said he was reluctant to call until we know more about it. We are getting a message for the Secretary to send on to Gromyko. Johnson said MacDonald was still out there. We could get MacDonald up to Chieng Khong (?) and ask him to work on Souphanouvong. We also need to do something with Souvanna Phouma in Paris. Bundy agreed. He does not see much more that we can do at this stage. If they pursue it, then we will have to “open the whole can of worms.”

Ball said he was trying to reach Averell now. Averell has nothing more than what we have in mind now. He does not think it is necessary to bother the boss with it. Bundy said he would be in his office on business in the morning.

Ball suggested they wait until after the next piece of information comes in in order to have a clearer picture and Bundy could call Ball from the country. Bundy suggested that Ball call the President at that time and before he gets on his boat, which he will probably do after church. Call him so that he has the word before he goes boating in case something comes through.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Laos. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the source text.
1. Reference is to the initial stages of a Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese attack on RLG forces in Nam Tha.
2. Reference is to advance reports on the fighting, one of which was probably CHMAAG telegram ML 9953, sent to CINCPAC at 7:56 p.m., May 6, Vientiane time (there is a 12-hour time difference between Vientiane and Washington), and probably received in advance form in Washington on the morning of May 6. In the Department of State copy, which was repeated from the Army and not received until 5:09 a.m. on May 7, the Chief of MAAG reported that the senior U.S. Army MAAG adviser was present during the attack and did not leave until the fall of the town was imminent. He believed that FAR troops gave a better account of themselves than during any previous engagements in the face of a Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese attack, which was well-planned, fully-coordinated, and skillfully executed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–762)