Office of the Historian

340. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0

Washington, May 3, 1962.

The attached draft1 cable answers all of the points raised in Ambassador Young’s first cable (Bangkok 1691)2 with the exception of any indication of when or under what circumstances we would restore financial assistance to the RLG. On the basis of his past experience, Averell is inclined to be a little skeptical about the arrangements between the Thais and Phoumi. While wanting to encourage the Thais to continue, he does not want to remove all pressures on them or on Phoumi at this stage.

His feelings are reinforced by the British (London’s 4029)3 and today’s cable from Young (Bangkok 1701)4 which suggests that the Thai arrangement is not yet acceptable to us.

Another message is being drafted in reply to Young’s second cable, which will discuss our position on military and financial pressures.5

Both Mac and I feel that you may wish to advise the Thais that we will resume financial assistance to the RLG, even before the formation of a coalition government, but only when we are satisfied that Phoumi is negotiating seriously toward a reasonable settlement.

M.V.F.6
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/1/62–5/9/62. No classification marking.↩
  2. Attached was a draft telegram sent as 1687 to Bangkok, May 3, which authorized Young to express the President’s appreciation for Sarit’s efforts. Young was to inform Sarit that the assurances which Phoumi requested of Souvanna should be part of the negotiations rather than preconditions for giving up his claim to Defense and Interior. Assurances for FAR during the integration period and arrangements for elections were legitimate subjects for hard bargaining, and Phoumi should make concrete proposals to Souvanna on them. The cable stated that the United States was unclear what the Thais had in mind concerning U.S. assurances to Phoumi and could do little more to assure him. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–162)↩
  3. Document 337.↩
  4. In telegram 4029, May 2, the Embassy in London reported that the British Foreign Office viewed Phoumi’s current moves as encouraging, but did not rule out that they were merely a ploy rather than serious willingness to resume negotiations. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–262)↩
  5. See footnote 2, Document 339.↩
  6. In telegram 1700 to Bangkok, May 4, the Department expressed disappointment with Thanat’s attitude. Until the United States saw the “color of Phoumi’s good faith” in his negotiations for a coalition, it was too early to discuss resumption of financial support for the RLG. Thanat’s condition that the United States provide assurance in case of the failure of the Souvanna coalition was “obviously impossible.” While the United States was prepared to give vigorous diplomatic and economic support, it could not give a “blank check on military intervention in Laos.” On military sanctions against Phoumi, the United States was prepared, in view of Phoumi’s minimally more cooperative attitude, to hold them in abeyance, but it should be made clear that they could be revived. Thanat’s remarks about signing the Geneva agreements were “incomprehensible,” but should not be pursued at present. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–362)↩
  7. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩