Office of the Historian

339. Memorandum of Conversation0

Washington, May 3, 1962, 6:04–6:10 p.m.

Notes of MVF Conversation with the President, May 3, 1962

I took up Bangkok 17011 with the President this afternoon. He commented as follows: [Page 713]

(1)
This is very discouraging in the light of Bangkok 1691.2
(2)
It is quite impossible for the United States to give the assurances referred to in (d). The main reason we gave the commitment to the Thais last month was to gain their help in connection with Laos,3 and they must not try to parlay this commitment to intervene in Laos.
(3)
We should stress that every week that goes by makes the solution more difficult of achievement, since Souvanna gets weaker.
(4)
We cannot consider financial assistance until there is real progress towards a coalition government.
(5)
While we cannot give military assistance, we can give vigorous diplomatic and economic support to a non-Communist coalition government.

The President was quite perturbed about the last 4 paragraphs of Bangkok 1701.4 I told him I did not think it should be taken literally, it being a characteristic of Thanat.

I pointed out that the President would not be in tomorrow or over the week end and asked whether he would permit me to clear the subsequent cables on this subject.5 He said he would.

The President stated he would like the sentence concerning “meaningful assurances” be eliminated from the draft telegrams. My impression is that a re-write of the sentence spelling out what is meant would meet the President’s objections.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, M.V. Forrestal, 1/62–5/62. Secret. Drafted by Forrestal. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.)↩
  2. In telegram 1701, May 3, Young reported a conversation which he had sought with Thanat to clarify his discussion with Sarit as reported in Document 337. Thanat stated that the RLG were seeking the following assurances before proceeding with serious negotiations on a coalition government: (a) that Souvanna agree to the Troika principle for Defense and Interior; (b) that there be a fair distribution of other portfolios on a 4–4–4–4 basis; (c) that the United States resume economic aid to Laos; and (d) that, if the coalition was endangered by Communist pressure, the United States would step in. Thanat added that Thailand also required the understanding as outlined in “d.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–362)↩
  3. Document 337.↩
  4. The President is referring to the Thanat-Rusk communique, March 6, 1962, issued at Washington and printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1091–1093. Documentation on the negotiations leading up to this agreement is in volume XXIII.↩
  5. In the last four paragraphs of telegram 1701 from Bangkok, Thanat informed Young that Thailand would probably not sign the Geneva Agreements on Laos. When asked which provisions bothered Thailand, Thanat stated that there were many, and Thailand had just gone along with the conference in order not to obstruct it. Pressed further by Young, Thanat stated that the provisions for removal of foreign troops was the worse problem. He hoped that the United States “had no illusions” about getting the Viet Minh out of Laos.↩
  6. See Document 340.↩