Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos⁰

Washington, March 28, 1962, 5:06 p.m.

845. Vientiane for Sullivan from Harriman. Embtel 1340.¹ Following are supplemental instructions concerning your Khang Khay trip:

1. Primary objective is to encourage Souvanna to keep trying.

2. Leave to yours and colleagues judgment in light Addis trip² and latest developments whether it desirable urge meeting between three factions or between Souvanna and Phoumi/Boun Oum. There are, of course, dangers in any meeting since Phoumi’s attitude as reported Embtel 1353³ and others could doom it to failure.

3. If Souvanna continues in his plan go to Paris you should renew invitation for him visit US enroute. Invitation should be issued in name USG and at direction Gov. Harriman. Details would be worked out if Souvanna accepts and when his plans are definite. We contemplate paying air fare from some point SEA to Paris via US for Souvanna and small entourage. We would also take care of his US expenses. Awaiting your specific recommendations after your visit. In view Souvanna sensitivities you may assure him that President as well as Sec State would be glad to see him.

4. Re prisoners: If appropriate during course your discussions you should point out to Souvanna and Souphanouvong that release of prisoners at this juncture would have favorable effect in US. This particularly so now when Administration under attack by some US elements for strong stand we have taken with Phoumi. Our latest information is that Shore, McMorrow, Ballenger and Wolfkill are held in PDJ; you might ask opportunity see them if time permits. In addition you should press for more frequent exchange of letters. (Thus far only one set received from PDJ prisoners and none from Bailey in spite of assurance given Harriman at Rangoon.) If possible you should take any undelivered letters with you and ask other side for any letters that have not been sent out. Plight of Bailey most disturbing since no one has seen him. You should ask for assurances that: (a) Bailey still alive, (b) PL will allow ICRC representative to interview him, (c) at least other side will facilitate exchange of mail, especially with Bailey.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–2862. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cross; cleared by Johnson, Harriman in draft, McGeorge Bundy in substance, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Koren. Repeated to Geneva for Fecon, to New Delhi, London, Paris, Bangkok, and CINCPAC.
1. In telegram 1340, March 27, Sullivan stated that in accordance with his instructions from Harriman, the main purposes of his trip to Khang Khay on March 30 would be to “dissuade Souvanna from throwing in his hand” and to do whatever he could to expedite the release of U.S. POW’s captured by the Pathet Lao. Sullivan recommended inviting Souvanna to Washington en route to his scheduled trip to Paris in early April and asked for authority to extend an invitation. (Ibid., 751J.00/3–2762)
2. British Ambassador Addis was leaving for Khang Khay at 10 a.m. on March 28. Before his departure, he told Sullivan and Charge Creel that he intended to try to keep Souvanna actively committed to forming a coalition and planned to suggest a three Princes’ meeting in Luang Prabang in the near future. (Ibid., 751J.00/3–2862)
3. In telegram 1353, March 28, Sullivan reported that Phoumi refused to give him permission for a direct flight from Vientiane to the Plaine des Jarres and expressed resentment against Harriman’s firm stand in their recent meetings. Phoumi reiterated his adamant opposition to a Souvanna coalition and asked the United States to reconsider its position. When Phoumi realized that Sullivan was under orders to go to Khang Khay, he stated he would not object to it, but would not approve it officially. (Ibid.) Sullivan went via Phnom Penh.