Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

318. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State⁰

Bangkok, March 26, 1962, 11 a.m.

1478. From Harriman. Following were present at three-hour discussion Ministry National Security Sunday morning:¹ Boun Oum, Phoumi, Khampan Panya, Sisouk, Nhouy, Leuam, Ngon Sananikone, Harriman, Creel, Sullivan, Forrestal, Gen Boyle, Chadbourn, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Col. Smart [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], General Phoumi, Sisouk and Ngon Sananikone spoke for RLG.

Phoumi opened meeting by RLG presentation saying we in accord on 1) need for peaceful solution, 2) need for coalition govt. However we clearly at odds re desirability Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister. After ten months discussions with Souvanna, RLG considers him not up to task forming such govt. In explanation RLG attitude, Sisouk gave historical review Laos political developments since 1954, claiming CDNI group had developed current policy on advice and guidance from US Govt. Said political upset Souvanna in 1957–8 had been at suggestion three major Western powers. Could not now understand change in US policy. Was it because Soviets had given US some assurances of which RLG not aware? Ngon Sananikone then followed with brief elaboration RLG distrust of Soviets and lack of confidence in Souvanna.

As patiently and carefully as possible, I answered all questions raised and touched on all points made by RLG. I said US could not accept responsibility for position in which RLG found itself today. All RLG friends, including Marshal Sarit, urging them negotiate sincerely for coalition govt under Souvanna as only alternative to disaster. No other alternative possible. King had flatly refused take any role other than that of constitutional monarch. Only salvation was Souvanna, alternative was disaster.

Affirmatively and in atmosphere President letter to King,² I stated US attitude on Souvanna coalition, explaining such flexibility as still remained in negotiations over Defense and Interior. I outlined in detail steps which would follow organization of govt; i.e., exit foreign mil personnel, integration armed forces, eventual elections. I pointed out we could judge good faith Communist side in each step and that we would support RLG officers commanding FAR forces until integration of opposing forces takes place presumably on some proportional basis. Said that we prepared continue economic and political assistance to non-Communist elements in Laos, but that we could provide this only within framework coalition govt, in which we consider Phoumi collaboration important. Phoumi said RLG could not agree. Souvanna had failed in his task. King might ask him come Vientiane give account of his efforts form govt, but serious negotiation for Souvanna-led govt now out of question. If US decided abandon Laos at this time, this would be most regrettable.

Since it was clear RLG reps had nothing further say, I told them that in my opinion and in opinion all their friends, they, individually and collectively, were taking on responsibility of driving their country to destruction. I would advise them earnestly on what this meant and, as a friend, would sincerely hope that they reconsider their policy. The meeting ended on this note.³ I am still hopeful of Sarit’s influence having effect.

Young

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–2662. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Geneva for the Secretary, London, Paris, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
1. Sunday, March 25, in Vientiane.
2. The Department of State prepared a Presidential letter to King Savang “to be held in reserve” for use in negotiations for a coalition government. It reminded the King that after 9 months the Geneva Conference was very close to a settlement that would allow for a united, neutral, and independent Laos. The formulation of a Lao Government of National Union and a single Lao delegation at Geneva representing it was now urgently required. The President stated it would be tragic to allow the achievements at Geneva to fail over disagreement over composition of the Lao Government with the probable result of resumption of hostilities. (Telegram 682 to Vientiane, January 31; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–3162)

3. On March 28, Harriman and William Bundy discussed Laos on the telephone. Harriman told Bundy that Sarit’s message to President Kennedy was that he had agreed to help with Phoumi and “that he’d stick to it.” Harriman remarked, “On Phoumi, he is much worse than I thought he was—(and you know how I’ve felt about him in the past)—I’ve never seen any thing like it.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Chronology, Telephone Conversations, December 1961–April 1962)

   Harriman sent Brown in Bangkok the following instruction on March 28:

   “Considering Phoumi’s continued arrogance, find all hands here agree with my hunch that it would be good thing to pull [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] out. It seems to me now is the time to do it while Sarit is bringing pressure on Phoumi. In addition, this conforms highest level suggestion to give Phoumi cold shoulder. Suggest you consider urgently.” (Telegram 1487 to Bangkok, March 28; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–2862)