Office of the Historian

294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos0

Washington, February 13, 1962, 2:33 p.m.

730. Embtel 1156.1

Your instructions give you full authority to use with your British and French colleagues all means at your disposal to bring about acceptable coalition government under Souvanna. You should not consider guidance we have given you as restrictive instructions. It is clear that as long as Phoumi continues reinforce Nam Tha PL/VM will shell airport. Thus early improvement Nam Tha situation seems unlikely. Therefore you should carry on discussions with Souvanna envisaged Deptel 7032 and take any other actions you feel are in line with our objectives. You should encourage Souvanna to continue his efforts form government. Souvanna said in Rangoon September3 delay in forming coalition government would weaken him vis-a-vis PL and you should do your best strengthen his position. This may require you in coordination with other two Ambassadors to see King earlier than suggested Deptel 704.4 Since it likely discussions with Souvanna will take some time, you will have opportunity emphasize that any actions we take with Phoumi consequent to these talks will depend for their success on status of cease-fire. FYI. However, seems clear that Phoumi determined block peaceful settlement and this will have to be dealt with when and if we reach satisfactory arrangement with Souvanna. End FYI.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–1362. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, Bangkok, and CINCPAC POLAD.↩
  2. In telegram 1156, February 13, Brown reported that Souvanna would likely go to Luang Prabang within the next 2 days and talk with Phoumi who would propose a government of councils under King Savang. The military pressure against Nam Tha would continue, but would fall short of actual assault. The British and French Ambassadors would press Brown to discuss a coalition government directly with Souvanna arguing that it was the last chance for a political settlement. Brown’s problem was that he was instructed to negotiate with Souvanna only after the attack on Nam Tha was halted. How should he react to this probable sequence of events? (Ibid.)↩
  3. Document 290.↩
  4. Reference is to Harriman-Souvanna discussions in Rangoon in mid-September 1961; see Document 184.↩
  5. Document 291.↩