293. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative’s Naval Aide (Bagley) to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)0

Attached notes outline situation in Laos as of today.

The contingency paper1 you have already seen is pertinent, but does not direct itself to the new approach to Souvanna. This raises new questions as to the role of the King which I have cited.

Our tactics are pretty well set. I suggest the need now is to discuss the contingencies in detail, and that should be the emphasis with the President.2 State has had a tendency to discuss pros and cons of short-term procedures without facing future consequences.

I checked with DOD(ISA) on their views on our Laos policy. Their main point is to repeat Ambassador Brown’s warning that when we go direct to Souvanna, we burn all bridges with Phoumi/Boun Oum, probably regardless of the outcome.

Sec/State and his advisors will have a full-blown talk on SEATO tomorrow.3

WHB

[Attachment]

LAOS

Governor Harriman’s main premise will be the need to cease U.S. support for Phoumi. He will cite Phoumi’s continued intransigence to U.S. guidance as the principal reason.

To drop Phoumi, the U.S. must see some other alternative. The question of someone else leading the RLG has been reviewed for weeks without an acceptable answer. Hence, the new tactic—approach Souvanna directly, determine his plans for composing a coalition government [Page 621] and for reconstitution of the Army and, if acceptable, support presentation of his proposals to the King. This will be a U.S.-UK-France tripartite approach to Souvanna contingent on ceasing PL activity in the Nam Tha area. The UK and France are going along with us but are leery of “cabinet-making” which would place ultimate responsibility for events in Laos on the Western powers. The direct approach, if the Souvanna proposals are unacceptable to us, will compromise our pres-ent tenuous relationship with the RLG and probably prevent further influence on them. If successful, however, it will avoid the dilemma of when and how to place sanctions on the RLG to encourage Phoumi/Boun Oum to negotiate on their own.

A satisfactory Souvanna solution could not be implemented without the concurrence of the King. He has not indicated great trust in Souvanna and this could be the weakest point of the new tactic.

Phoumi has meanwhile increased emphasis on a de facto partition of Laos (based on cease-fire lines) as the best solution remaining. A fall-back on this idea is a north-south partition. Phoumi would probably have Thai and SVN sympathy in a move for partition, but the King would resist a southern bastion. A second “Phoumi solution” is a government headed by the King.

There is still the possibility of a Princes’ meeting in Luang Prabang. Boun Oum has stated this depends on a cease-fire, a withdrawal of VM forces from Laos, and a military representatives’ meeting at Ban Hin Heup to discuss the cessation of hostilities.

The crux of any discussion is the possible contingencies (some of these are in the attached memo which you have seen) and what we would do. If we disregard the political origins, a partition along the current cease-fire lines would be strategically sound to defend Thailand, but would not cover the area of infiltration into SVN. A north-south partition would accomplish the latter, but not the former. Both solutions would extend the role of Laos as a sharp line of demarcation between east and west which the ideal “neutral” solution would avoid.

The Souvanna approach is attractive because it avoids the levy of military sanctions on the RLG. If this were done to break the Defense/Interior impasse, the RLG would be weak for subsequent negotiations on other ministries and personalities, as well as during the period the national army was reconstituted.

The neutral Laos we seek depends on Soviet good faith. It also depends on the Soviets being able to control the ChiComs at a time when their mutual relations are at a low ebb. Regardless of whether a political solution is reached, this remains a risk, particularly re infiltration via Laos into SVN.

  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos 7, T–028–69. Secret.
  2. The President met with Harriman, Taylor, and McGeorge Bundy at the White House from 4:15 to 6:20 p.m. The meeting was characterized as “off the record” and no other account of it has been found. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book)
  3. Apparent reference to a State/Defense paper summarized in Document 292.
  4. An account of that meeting is included in volume XXIII.