Office of the Historian

291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos0

Washington, February 6, 1962, 8:31 p.m.

704. Following is outline of plan for direct negotiations with Souvanna referred to in Deptel 703.1

1.
Obtain cessation of attack on Nam Tha or if it has fallen into enemy hands, withdrawal of PL/Viet Minh forces from it.
2.
US, UK and French ambassadors, in manner they determine most effective approach Souvanna in Xieng Khouang and/or Luang Prabang taking line that we now ready discuss directly with Souvanna his intentions re formation government of national union and are prepared [Page 617] support Souvanna if we can reach general understanding with him on government he would form and other important matters such as demobilization and integration. We would need to know exact nature of cabinet he willing and able form. For example, we would expect Souvanna to be ready to include nine strong capable and experienced Vientiane elements in his cabinet, including four responsible posts for Phoumi and RLG.
3.
If we regard Souvanna’s proposals as forming acceptable basis for supporting him co-Chairmen would be invited to Laos by ICC, ostensibly to observe progress 3 princes negotiations, but really to add weight to support we might give Souvanna, and keep military situation under control.
4.
Souvanna would go to King, and present his proposed government. Three ambassadors and co-Chairmen would follow saying that they prepared support this government and see no acceptable alternative they could support.
5.
Entire process would be carried out in style carefully calculated to avoid affront to Lao sensibilities, especially those of Monarch.
6.
Approach to Souvanna could include invitation to visit US in manner that conveyed to him he would be welcome at time when he felt he could conveniently come.

French and British here given gist foregoing.

Objective of the above is to take initiative away from Phoumi, and prevent him from forcing our hand. Our actions step by step can be adjusted to developments. Obviously strict observance of ceasefire during this period by both sides essential.2

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–662. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cleveland and Cross, cleared by Rice, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to London, Bangkok, Paris, and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
  2. Document 290.↩
  3. In telegram 1123, February 7, Brown reported that there were indications of prog-ress toward a cease-fire and a possible meeting between Souvanna and Boun Oum in Luang Prabang. Brown therefore was suggesting waiting until there was renewed evidence of Phoumi-Boun Oum obduracy. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–762)↩