Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

283. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State⁰

Vientiane, January 29, 1962, 2 p.m.

1059. I saw Phoumi at my request 1100 Jan 29. In response question whether meeting with Souvanna was definitely fixed for Feb 2, Phoumi replied that Souvanna had asked only for audience with King. He had not suggested a meeting with Boun Oum. He had been advised that King would receive him and awaited further details about his arrival. Phoumi and Boun Oum nevertheless plan go LP Feb 1 for audience with King and will remain for discussions with Souvanna on Feb 2 if he wishes them. Phoumi said he had impression that Souvanna would stay a while in LP. He did not think Souphanouvong was coming. I reverted to central question of Defense and Interior, saying it was evident that there could be no Govt if these posts did not go to center. I had been very much disappointed at report from Amb Young of the meeting with Sarit Jan 21.¹ I had gained impression from this report that Phoumi had decided to insist on keeping Defense and Interior. In such case there could be no govt.

Phoumi said question was very difficult. It had been in effect their decision but they were continuing their consideration. It was absolutely essential that Phoumi have at least minimum means of protecting the anti-Communist position. Phoumi said he hoped that Souvanna would continue discussions in LP in same spirit that had prevailed at Geneva. Theretofore Souvanna had refused any discussion until he had a categorical yielding of Defense and Interior to center. At Geneva for first time they were able to consider the conditions under which these posts might be given to center.

I said this was exactly way in which we had envisaged negotiations proceeding.

Phoumi said he had majority of his Cabinet against him and was having hard time persuading them. But they would try to work out and propose a series of formulae for composition of govt which would not be far distant from that set forth in procis verbale signed at Geneva.

I told Phoumi that the [garble—US Govt?] myself included, had high opinion of his capacity to influence his followers and were unanimously convinced that if he took a position strongly he would prevail with them. I asked if he was now working to try to persuade them to try to accept a formula with the two key positions in the center. He said, “yes.”

He said there would be further discussions during week when Ngon, Bounthong, Khamphan Panya, Sisouk and Leuam Rajasombath returned from their exploratory voyages. They had gone to UN, Washington and elsewhere to inform themselves of international sentiment. Their views would influence final decision. I said that practically unanimous opinion in Geneva has been and still was that these two posts would have to go center. I had checked with my own govt and found that this was still its firm opinion at very highest level of Secretary and President.

I stressed that unless these two posts went to center there would be no govt. If there were no govt, this would be tragedy. All good work done at Geneva would be lost. Phoumi said he had been struck by fact that all of Communist delegations had left Geneva. He had sent a message to co-chairmen but MacDonald had been unable to act on it in absence of Pushkin. I said that this perhaps indicated fragility of international structure so laboriously erected at Geneva and importance of establishing new govt soonest.

Phoumi then volunteered that he had received message from Sarit on Jan 27 which told him arguments US had been using with Sarit and asked him to come Bangkok for discussion. This Phoumi could not do because he had to receive Crown Prince at airport this morning (this is correct). Sarit had then sent him much longer message repeating almost completely memo which US had given Sarit² and realizing extreme difficulty of Phoumi’s decision, but saying perhaps it would be best for him to follow the American advice. Sarit was busy afternoon Jan 29. Phoumi said it was now hardly worthwhile to go to see him. He probably would not do so.

Phoumi said that if he was unable to get a clear majority opinion in his Cabinet matter could be decided by King. I said I was sure King would follow any advice Phoumi gave him. Phoumi said he would prefer to have clear-cut Cabinet decision to present to King. This was what he was trying to get. He said Prince Khamking had already taken to LP broad aspects of problem which he had obtained from Boun Oum. Phoumi said, he “did not go to Pakse just for ceremonies.”

At end I asked Phoumi if I could telegraph Dept that he had assured me that he personally was now working for a solution based on Defense and Interior in the center provided other portfolios could be satisfactorily negotiated. Phoumi said, “not yet.” He said, “wait a few days,” when he would have more details. I told him I was going to see King this afternoon.³ I would repeat to him our views of importance of a coalition and impossibility of getting it without Defense and Interior in center, that this was firm opinion of US Govt at highest level and that next few days would probably be crucial in resolution of this problem. Phoumi nodded in agreement at this last observation.

Comment: Phoumi subdued and evidently somewhat shaken in his position, probably by Sarit’s advice. He has not yet, however, by any means decided give in. I did not think it wise to exert more severe pressure until there had been time for Sarit’s message really to sink in and to be conveyed to Cabinet.

Brown

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2961. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Geneva for Fecon, priority to London, Paris, and Bangkok, and to Saigon and CINCPAC for POLAD.
1. See footnote 3, Document 276.
2. Apparent reference to a letter from Kennedy to Sarit, January 20, setting forth the reasons for supporting a coalition government in Laos. The text is in telegram 1043 to Bangkok, January 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2062) This document and others on efforts to enlist Thailand’s support for U.S. policies in Laos are included in volume XXIII.
3. In telegram 1062 from Vientiane, January 29, Brown reported his conversation with the King who received him coldly and glowered at him. As the conversation proceeded, the King relaxed. Brown concluded that the King was obviously irked at outside interference in Laos’ affairs. Brown also concluded that the King was still very much in Phoumi’s camp and would do little to push him in the direction which the United States wanted him to go. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2962)