Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos⁰

Washington, January 29, 1962, 6:11 p.m.

676. Eyes Only Ambassadors and Adm. Felt. Embtel 1058.¹

We fully aware Phoumi controls RLG; this is reason for concentrating on him. We have carefully weighed pros and cons of various carrot and stick combinations and have concluded that present tactic seems to have most punch despite weaknesses you point out. We do not believe that Lao politicians and military leaders are so devoted Phoumi personally that if they saw he were completely cut off by US they would all follow him into personal and national disaster. Much would depend upon your success in conveying sense of Phoumi isolation to King and other Lao leaders. You would of course point out that tragic consequences their continuing blindly support Phoumi would be Phoumi’s fault alone but could be quickly and effectively averted by new leadership taking over. As indicated Deptel 669² if this does not have desired effect we would of course have to go on with sanctions. Deposit February check will be postponed in any event for its psychological effect but our economic programs (e.g. Meo relief and village programs, etc.) will not be affected.

We plan instruct you take actions described Deptel 669 on day before Phoumi goes Luang Prabang indicating action by us would await outcome his meeting with Souvanna. Our reasoning for suggesting this timing is as follows: (1) Earlier date would give Phoumi too much time to rally support or break off meeting. (2) To initiate action after meeting would be too late since we feel next Luang Prabang meeting would be crucial in determining whether or not Souvanna would continue with his efforts. Please comment.

We believe that absence Souphanouvong from Luang Prabang meeting must not be used as excuse for Phoumi intransigence. In fact it provides real opportunity for serious negotiations away from Communist influence and gives Phoumi chance to come to personal understanding with Souvanna which we have been advising for months.

Line taken by Phoumi in his message to Sarit (Bangkok’s 1089 to Department)³ is in sharp contrast to attitude shown in his talk with you (Vientiane’s 1059).⁴ Please comment.

FYI. Re your 1047⁵ believe you will agree that risk sanctions weakening FAR not really relevant as FAR now clearly incapable stem PL/VM offensive. Incidentally Pushkin has constantly made it plain he would not be responsible for holding back Communist side until agreement signed. End FYI.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2962. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cross and Queneau, cleared by Cleveland and Rice, and approved by Harriman. Repeated niact to Bangkok and CINCPAC POLAD.
1. In telegram 1058, January 29, Brown “respectfully” suggested that there was little to be gained by cutting off contact with Phoumi so long as the United States continued to support the RLG and FAR. As Brown stated, Phoumi was the RLG and there were no other conservative leaders of any stature on the horizon. Breaking off personal contact with Phoumi would not phase him; he rarely initiated a meeting with Brown, Hasey, or Boyle. The only means of pressuring Phoumi, in Brown’s view, was decisive sanctions against him. (Ibid.)
2. Document 279.
3. In telegram 1089, January 29, Young reported a discussion with Thai General Whallop who informed Young that Phoumi had just sent Sarit a “scorning” reply to an invitation to come to Bangkok and discuss his differences with the United States. Phoumi vowed to yield nothing and to fight alone if the United States withdrew its aid to the RLG. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2962)
4. Document 283.
5. See footnote 3, Document 276.