Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union⁰

Washington, January 28, 1962, 9:23 a.m.

1758. Dept. called in Soviet Charge Smirnovsky, January 27, to see Harriman on Laos. Harriman talked informally from following oral statement which was then given to Smirnovsky: You should, at your discretion, follow up at appropriate level with Soviet ForOff.

Begin verbatim text (unnecessary words omitted). USG has made clear its intentions to negotiate with other interested nations peaceful settlement of Laos problem. In pursuit of this aim we have been doing everything we can to induce Prime Minister Prince Boun Oum and Deputy Prime Minister, General Phoumi Nosavan, to negotiate in good faith with the other parties in Laos. We believe that tentative agreements reached by three Princes, which were embodied in their signed but unpublished communique, offered basis for final negotiations leading to formation of Govt. of national union. As result, we have hoped that next meeting of three Princes, expected during next few days in Laos, will enable Lao parties to form Govt. and to send united delegation, representing that Govt., to Geneva Conference.

It is obviously essential that this favorable trend not be upset by military provocations from either side. USG has been disturbed by reports of growing number of incidents and counter-moves from both sides. It is to interest of all parties concerned that these increased activities be stopped and that both US and Soviet Union use their influence to keep cease-fire intact. USG has insisted that RLG [sic] in no uncertain terms that forces of RLG undertake no provocative action, and has impressed upon that Govt. that we would not support them if they did. We would hope that Soviet Govt. will make similar efforts to prevent Pathet Lao from undertaking aggressive actions against RLG forces.

As Soviet Govt. knows from Mr. Sullivan’s talks with Mr. Pushkin in Geneva on January 7,¹ USG believes that it may become necessary at some point to exert further pressures on Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan to induce them to negotiate in good faith and not to obstruct settlement by unreasonable demands. Such pressures might even have to take form of sanctions such as withholding aid, effect of which can temporarily weaken RLG militarily and in bargaining for reasonable settlement on Govt. of national union. Mr. Sullivan pointed out that under these circumstances, we would need assurances from Soviet Govt. that they will see to it that PL do not take advantage of the situation to undertake aggressive military actions against forces of RLG. Mr. Harriman also discussed this point with Soviet delegate recently in Geneva but we have not yet had indication of position of Soviet Govt. on this matter.

USG hopes that next meeting of three Princes will produce agreement on Govt. of national union. However, for these meetings to be successful, all parties to negotiations must display spirit of give and take. As Secretary of State Rusk mentioned in his talk with Soviet Charge on January 13,² some of public statements made by Prince Souphanouvong have been contentious and have made no contribution to reasonable spirit of negotiation. Prince Souphanouvong has failed to attend several agreed-upon meetings of three Princes, and now we hear reports that he may not attend next meeting in Luang Prabang, which would of course set back negotiations further. We hope that Soviet Govt. will use its influence on Prince Souphanouvong to refrain from unhelpful statements and urge him to take part in negotiations among Lao parties with spirit of compromise and good will.

USG is reassured by statement of Mr. Smirnovsky of January 13 that Soviet Govt. still holds that settlement of Laotian problem, on basis which was agreed during meeting in June 1961 in Vienna, would be in keeping with our mutual interests. Since our mutual interests are involved, we confidently expect we can continue to operate in same spirit of cooperation which has characterized our discussions at Geneva. End verbatim text.

In amplification of oral statement, Harriman made following points:

1. There are still many details to be worked out among three Princes but with good will and patience they could come to agreement. US position clear that posts of Defense and Interior should not go to either wing, which Harriman has stated publicly. We hope that Souphanouvong will cooperate in making it possible to give RLG two acceptable ministries.

2. It difficult to determine who started recent incidents. UPI accounts of Mahaxay gave impression fighting started there by RLG side which we consider inaccurate. On other hand we believe that attack on Nom Tha was initiated by other side. We need not argue about this as our joint objective is to get both sides to desist from hostilities.

3. Although Harriman mentioned Sullivan approach to Pushkin when he last saw him in Geneva, he did not take this up in detail because he thought that Princes were coming to agreement based on their communique given privately to Co-Chairmen.

4. Harriman wished assure Soviets that USG will persevere in efforts obtain peaceful settlement and counseled patience if matters do not work out right away. We all recognize that it difficult bring parties together who have been fighting civil war.

5. Harriman will instruct Brown to cooperate closely with Abramov in helping move negotiations forward, and suggested Soviets instruct Abramov likewise.

6. Soviets may wish to discuss foregoing further with our Embassy in Moscow.³

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2862. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Vientiane and Geneva Fecon.
1. See footnote 2, Document 266.
2. See footnote 3, Document 270.
3. When Ambassador Thompson inquired about the Harriman-Smirnovsky conversation on January 29 in Moscow, Soviet official Kuznetzov seemed only dimly aware of it. Thompson therefore repeated the entire representation to him. (Telegram 2075 from Moscow, January 29; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–1962)