Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

280. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁰

Honolulu, Hawaii, January 27, 1962.

271431Z. Laos military situation. A. My 092052Z.¹ B. CHMAAG Laos 251355Z cite ML–OPT 494.²

1. Analysis of recent intelligence reveals changing developments and trends which dictate reappraisal of relative posture of combatant sides in Laos. In para 2d (1) ref A, I cited that intervention by DRV could be built up to change balance of military power. Evidence now indicates significant VM build up. FAR considers Viet Minh as ten feet tall in view of their battle-tested experience and defeat of French (considered first class power) during the Indo-China war. Sensing intense FAR fear of VM regulars, enemy is capitalizing on this by using regular VM units. Viet Minh military growth in Laos has affected all areas now in enemy hands and to a greater degree involves regularly organized tactical Viet Minh units.

2. In interim since so-called cease-fire, FAR forces have militarily improved their posture and combat ability versus Lao PL/KL enemy, and on this plateau level of contest, I believe balance of military power lies with FAR. Over a period of eight months, FAR has increased its control over disputed areas and conducted successful sweeps against KL/PL opposition. However, the equation of contest has been altered with introduction of substantial Viet Minh forces, and overall balance of military power is vested with enemy at this juncture. When FAR approached those areas of strategic or critical value to enemy, Communists used Sunday punch, VM units, which defeated and/or disorganized FAR. Viet Minh units then withdrew into reserve and were replaced by PL/KL. Psychological impact of growing presence of VM into combat action. FAR’s military growth/progress thus has been negated to a large extent by Red introduction of this new phase of Communist intervention. Communists have gone to extreme effort to conceal location/strength of VM units and have used them only in counterattack role.

3. Recurring intell reports from various US agencies in Laos, coupled with increased enemy resistance to FAR opns in widespread sectors of Laos, provide a library of strong evidence that Communist force has been reinforced with sizeable Viet Minh (VM) cadre, units, and combat material/equipment during the past two months. Most difficult to determine VM strength and disposition with validity. However, I accept minimum of 7,400 VM in Laos (5,000 combat—2,400 advisors), but an estimate as high as 10,000 is not unreasonable. Details on VN ob/disposition sent to DIA via SSO channels by my 252310Z.³

4. From strategic positions within Laos, VM can rapidly and effectively move to take over from or reinforce PL/KL units at most, if not all, of present major fronts. This capability clearly demonstrated in recent operations in Nam Beng Valley, and Mahaxay areas where VN bns intervened to repel advancing FAR units. History of current actions near Nam Tha probably will reinforce this picture of VM versatility.⁴ It is likely that enemy will continue use his VN units in combat as necessary in areas he considers critical, whether it be in a defensive or offensive role. Adding to VM force flexibility and striking power is recently acquired amphibious tanks. Excellent cruising power is recently acquired amphibious tanks. Excellent cruising range amphibious quality, and relatively light ground pressure these versatile vehicles will permit them to bypass or surmount wide variety of obstacles and arrive in unexpected areas with considerable phychological impact on both warring sides where employed. Significant point is that Communists now have constituted with Laos an immediate reinforcement capability of VM units and tanks to provide overwhelming combat superiority at critical points of contact.

5. On the friendly side, it would be noted that FAR as now constituted and disposed has no significant reserve. In Nam Tha sector and in Mahaxay area, FAR forces would require early and substantial reinforcement from less active sectors to hold what they have; and in Mahaxay area to counter an enemy thrust to Thakhek and prevent division of lower Laos. Additionally, I would offer that under present military situation we must anticipate that Viet Minh forces need only to attack strongly at given points to propel FAR units into ground-giving retreats wherein either VM or PL/KL forces can advance easily.

6. In summary, ref B points up seriousness of current situation and provides new evaluation of changing power balance resulting from increasing VM intervention/actions. In respect to this mounting scale of DRV intervention, it is more than timely to evaluate for face value the Soviets whose duplicity marches on. Noteworthy in this connection is fact that Soviet First Secretary in Vientiane has had gall to flatly deny Viet Minh presence in Laos. Such a patent falsehood coupled with recent VM buildup should cause us carefully consider how much faith we can put in Soviet professions of peaceful intention at Geneva.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/16/62–1/31/62. Secret; Operational Immediate. Repeated to the White House for Taylor, to the MAAG Chief in Laos, to CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, and PACAF. The source text is the White House copy.
1. In this telegram, January 9, Felt updated his estimate of the capabilities of RLG forces against Pathet Lao, Kong Le’s, and North Vietnamese forces by answering specific questions about the number of DRV advisers and units in Laos, operational supplies of the PL/KL forces, ability of the RLG to retake PL-held territory, and the ability of the DRV and China to come to the PL/KL force’s aid. Felt noted that DRV intervention could change the current military balance of power in Laos and suggested that the United States must be ready and willing to fight in Laos. (Ibid., 2/20/62–2/22/62)
2. In this telegram, January 25, Chief of MAAG General Boyle expressed concern about the recent pattern of enemy activity in Laos and failure of certain FAR tactical operations during January. Boyle believed that FAR had improved during the period August-December 1961, but over the past 3 months there was a marked buildup of North Vietnamese forces in Laos. As a consequence, FAR had suffered recent reverses. What particularly worried Boyle was that FAR had “no stomach” for engaging the North Vietnamese and ran when they encountered them. (Ibid.)
3. Not found.
4. In telegram 271417Z, Felt informed the JCS that enemy action in the vicinity of Nam Tha followed the previous Communist pattern of counterattacking with North Vietnamese forces in critical areas. Felt was disinclined to believe that the Nam Tha counterattack was a prelude to an offensive, but the RLG garrison at Nam Tha could be taken at the enemy’s choosing. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/16/62–1/31/62)