Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

284. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, January 30, 1962.

The Current Situation in Laos

I caught up with Averell Harriman this morning and he reports that for the moment the situation looks slightly better. Your message to Sarit has produced a message from Sarit to Phoumi which appears to have been much stronger than the last one,¹ and currently Phoumi is headed safely toward the next meeting of the Princes on Friday.

Tomorrow Brown will deliver your letter to Phoumi² which makes clear your personal interest in and support for all he has heard from Harriman and Brown. It also makes clear that as long as he follows the lines Brown and Harriman have indicated, he can count on your personal friendship and support. Brown will follow up with a clear indication that on the other hand if he does not cooperate, he will find himself alone. He will also point out that the U.S. public would not tolerate U.S. participation in any resumption of fighting now that a peaceful settlement is in sight. He will point out the grave military weakness of Phoumi’s forces, and he will urge that Phoumi work strongly not only for his own personal future but for the survival of an effective non-Communist element in the new government.³

Harriman has his fingers crossed, but thinks that for the moment the matter is on the track. There will be no specific deadline for sanctions against Phoumi in the communications tomorrow, but Harriman is on the alert to apply such pressure if it becomes necessary when the meetings of the three Princes resume.

McG. B.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/16/62–1/31/62. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text by Bundy indicates that the President saw it.
1. See footnote 3, Document 283.
2. See Document 278.
3. In telegram 1071 from Vientiane, January 31, Brown reported that he delivered the President’s message to Phoumi at 4 p.m. After Phoumi had read the message, Brown presented points one, two, and four of Document 279. Phoumi responded that he was not able to give a definitive answer until he had seen other Lao leaders, the King, and until after the meetings in Luang Prabang. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–3162)