Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

258. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative’s Naval Aide (Bagley) to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)⁰

Washington, January 5, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Issues in Laos

That which follows outlines the major issues to be decided in Laos.¹

Political

You are familiar with the current political situation. The U.S. position at this time is to support the Geneva Conference invitation to the Princes to meet in Geneva. Ambassador Brown was directed to urge Boum Oum/Phoumi to attend, and was advised sanctions against the RLG would not be levied at this time. (Sanctions to State now seem to mean withdrawal of military support and military funds.) State believes it would be better that a break with Phoumi/Boun Oum was based on refusal to negotiate than on the issue of two specific cabinet posts (Defense and Interior).

The questions that face State are these:

a. If sanctions were applied, would Phoumi lose the loyalties of the RLG and FAR?

b. Is there government and army leadership to replace Phoumi which would be willing to negotiate?

c. If Phoumi went south, what government and army following would he draw?

d. Prior to a break with Phoumi, could an understanding be reached with Souvanna?

Basic to all these questions is the crux of the problem—whether Phoumi will accept any Souvanna solution. State has unconsciously decided in the negative. This view has been given some sustenance by Phoumi’s machinations which we have been unable to understand. If we should decide now to give Phoumi the benefit of the doubt (and assume he will really negotiate) the support of a Geneva 3 Princes meeting is consistent. His resistance so far may really be due to his feeling Defense and Interior under Souvanna neutrals is dangerous. He is in a much better position to know that than we are (the Western powers have never claimed intimate knowledge of Lao personalities though our policies re Souvanna assume it). The alternative to continued support of Phoumi is wound up in the unpredictable questions listed above. There is more uncertainty in those factors than in the Phoumi partnership.

If we decide to support Phoumi at Geneva (and a positive indication of support will be necessary to get him there with rational intentions), certain related action will be required:

a. Call Ambassador Brown home. His usefulness is at an end.

b. Set up a meeting with Phoumi and Boun Oum with a forceful US diplomat (Harriman or Bowles, and preferably the latter) to talk out past difficulties and indicate our support for true negotiations to form an acceptable Souvanna government.

c. Tell the Soviets we are backing “free” negotiations, but will guarantee support for Phoumi will be withdrawn if he commences hostilities, but warning against Communist shenanigans.

The only issue before the President is whether to continue support of Phoumi in seeking a Souvanna solution satisfactory to the Lao.

Military

The military situation is described in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]² CincPac 050218Z.³ General Boyle’s comments have not been received. The thrust of the reports is that FAR capabilities, including present US encadrement, now exceed those of the PL if Communist external support is not significantly increased. General Boyle has indicated these capabilities will not be blunted by withdrawal of US support to the military for a period of 30 days under current conditions. Resumption of hostilities would constrict this period to 2–3 weeks. The FAR logistic organization, with US advisors, has achieved significantly increased effectiveness and can utilize supplies available. US SEATO forces are at DefCon 3 and could be deployed now within 72 hours, or less with prior alert.

There has been active US prestocking of supplies in Thailand since August 1961. There is a 30-day FAR war reserve of general supplies, ammo, and construction materiel; a FAR training and light operations reserve of 105 days for ammo, and 90 days for general supplies and construction materiel; and a 20-day supply of POL and avgas for Phase II US operations. Supplies are located at Tahkli, Khorat, Udorn, Ubon, and Bangkok.

Airlift now in Laos/Thailand plus that available from CAT and the C–123s at Clark Field represent increased air transport assets over that available prior to the cease fire. A MAAG Laos logistic detachment is set up in Thailand to administer the current pipeline with MAAG Thailand assistance; a cadre US logistic command is in Okinawa and can be air lifted to Thailand within 72 hours.

The current positioning of FAR forces has a center of gravity in Southern Laos; six of nine Groupes Mobiles are at the Vientiane line or south. The main concentrations of enemy forces are in the north, in the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, and in the Plaines des Jarres. Friendly MEO forces are mainly in the Plaines des Jarres area with some units to the east and southeast along Routes 7 and 13.

Recent FAR combat operations have been directed against enemy units in the Thakhet area and near Tha Thom (35 miles SE of Plaines des Jarres). DIA estimates state the FAR could hold parts of Luang Prabang Province in the north, and the provinces of Saravane, Savannakhat, and Khammouane in the south. Other lightly defended PL areas could be claimed. The PL would continue to hold Tchepone and entry points along Routes 8 and 12.

The major military/politico questions are:

a. Will Phoumi initiate hostilities, either overtly or by provoking overt action by the other side?

b. What support would he provide in each of these two contingencies?

c. If Phoumi withdraws passively to the south, would we support him, particularly in view of the fact he would then be astride Communist supply lines into SVN?

d. In view of the FAR capability even without US support, would Phoumi initiate hostilities with the idea of gaining quick successes, stopping at Geneva insistence before supplies ran out, and politically exploiting the advantages achieved?

The King has expressed the view that withdrawal of US support would prevent RLG military operations. Phoumi undoubtedly shares this view. He is also aware of our intense desire to find an acceptable Souvanna solution. If we indicate our acceptance of the political course of action suggested above (support true Lao negotiations) we would exploit the improving military balance without prejudice to the fact that we hold the military strings. This should continue to hold Phoumi in check. It would be interesting to see what an unfettered Phoumi might accomplish. Our Ambassador’s close liaison with him is in sharp contrast to the recent report that the Soviet Ambassador was not well informed as to what went on at the Vientiane 3 Princes meeting.

The US/FAR military capability can best be described as a cocked pistol, fully loaded, waiting for the word to fire. There is support for any political action decided upon.

WHB⁴

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, National Security Council, Special Group (CI), Meetings, 4/7/61–6/8/62. Secret.
1. On the morning of January 5, McGeorge Bundy presided over the daily staff meeting at the White House. According to a memorandum by Taylor’s aide, Colonel Ewell, January 5, the discussion on Laos was as follows:

   “There was a brief discussion of the Laos situation. The meeting with the President on Saturday was mentioned. Mr. Bundy mentioned that General Taylor wished to catch up on this situation. He pointed out that the Pentagon had raised the point that we might have overestimated our bargaining power in view of the Laotian Army’s increased capabilities. However, he didn’t see how we could switch back to a less harsh policy towards Phoumi when Souvanna looks well-behaved and Phoumi looks terrible. One of the staff said that he thought we ought to really pull the rug from under Phoumi immediately. I cautioned that from the President’s point of view, he might not be able to act on principle but would have to consider the political impact of our taking affirmative action which would be followed by a state of chaos in Laos. Bundy agreed with this, and said the real problem would be how you could change horses in mid-stream without getting a complete deterioration of the situation.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily White House Staff Meetings, Jan-Apr 62, T–124–69)

2. [Footnote not declassified]
3. In CINCPAC 050218Z, January 5, Felt stated that the improvement of FAR-U.S. military capabilities in Laos meant that “the balance of power between the RLG and the Xieng Khoung (Souvanna Phouma-Souphanouvong) Group is beginning to shift in favor of the RLG.” Felt suggested that the United States could use this new RLG power without introducing U.S. combat troops to improve the RLG’s negotiating position by creating a military stalemate. Felt’s belief was based on improvements in FAR due to better training, leadership, weapons competence, encadrement, and most importantly the military capability of minority groups, especially the Meo. Felt believed a stronger RLG military position would improve the eventual chance for a neutral Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–562)
4. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. The initialed original is in National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos-SEATO 62, T–641–71H.