Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos⁰

Washington, January 4, 1962, 7:54 p.m.

589. Ref Embtels 939¹ and 924.² This message authorizes you to inform Phoumi at your discretion that if he attacks or unilaterally withdraws to South US will withdraw MAAG advisers, air support and supplies. You also have authority to implement these sanctions to the extent you consider necessary. Methods used of course would depend upon tactical political and military situation prevailing at the time of which you and your military advisers are best judges. In present case suggest you have Boyle go to Phoumi and tell him MAAG officers will not participate in any provocative FAR action and he would withdraw them.

You are correct in assuming that if other side clearly initiates hostilities we would continue our support of FAR. In this connection assume that during this critical period MAAG is taking precautions to prevent FAR from operations which could be provocative to other side.³

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–562. Drafted by Cross, cleared in substance with Johnson and Rusk and in draft with Cleveland, and approved by Harriman. Repeated niact to Geneva for Fecon and CINCPAC, and to Bangkok, London, and Paris.
1. In telegram 939, January 5, the Embassy reported that Radio Vientiane had broadcast a statement by Phoumi that Souvanna’s attempts to form a coalition had failed and the “enemy” were initiating fighting on a number of fronts. The Embassy stated that military and intelligence sources did not consider the fighting described by Phoumi as unusual or dramatic. Brown suggested that Phoumi was preparing a justification for his own attack and insisted on an answer to his question about withdrawing U.S. military support. (Ibid.)
2. See footnote 6, Document 253.
3. In telegram 955 from Vientiane, January 8, Brown reported that MAAG Chief Boyle had reinforced Brown’s demarche to Phoumi and that MAAG officers throughout the country were on alert for indications of FAR attacks. Brown warned, however, that in the final analysis, the MAAG Chief had no command control over FAR. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–862)