Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

253. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State⁰

Vientiane, January 3, 1962, 3 p.m.

932. For Secretary and Assistant Secretary Harriman from Ambassador Brown. Reference: Deptel 583.¹

Hard facts of situation are as follows:

1) Present RLG will not yield on keeping defense and interior unless forced to do so and may well resign rather than yield on this point. Therefore under existing circumstances continuance of negotiations appears impossible.

2) King will do nothing to persuade government to change its position.

3) Though I have not yet ever told Phoumi, nor did I tell King this morning, that we would cut off aid, but have merely told Phoumi that we could not support him in position which he has taken and that he risked losing U.S. support, King believes and says government believes we have now cut off aid. Government may so advise press, or this is likely to leak to press from Lao sources. Then we will face public questions. We cannot hold this situation for long.

4) We are therefore forced to act and act fast if we are ever to convince Phoumi we have any independence of him, or to get him to yield on defense and interior, or resign instead. He may of course do neither, but sit tight, go to the brush, or adopt other extreme alternatives envisaged Embtel 709.²

5) Thus, for us to impose sanctions is very risky. It may not work. RLG may simply dig in and our sanctions will then have increasingly harmful effect on Lao people, army, economy. It will encourage PL and Communists and may result in new pressures by them which will worsen military situation and provoke hostilities without clear-cut demonstration as to who is responsible and thus put us in most difficult position. If, on other hand, we do not act, we fall deeper into Phoumi’s hands and remain at impasse in negotiations for formation of government.

In this unenviable dilemma I regretfully renew my recommendation that we now suspend military deliveries into the country.³ How we handle this with press will be subject of separate telegram. For military effect see ML OPT 16 January 2.⁴ I would also like an answer to the question in the last paragraph of Embtel 924.⁵ In case we are confronted by a sudden resumption of hostilities.

Brown

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–362. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Geneva for Fecon, priority to London, Paris, and CINCPAC for POLAD, and to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and New Delhi.
1. In telegram 583, January 2, the Department (Harriman was the drafter and Rusk approved the cable) instructed Brown not to initiate sanctions against the Royal Lao Government, but instead to use Souvanna’s departure for Paris as a brief period of stocktaking. The Department also stated that it felt the Defense and Interior Ministries could not be obtained for the RLG, and if given up, the overall composition of the coalition appeared negotiable. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–262)
2. In telegram 709, November 14, Brown reported that Phoumi stated that if the United States withdrew its support for the RLG, the Boun Oum government would fall and Phoumi himself would resign and go into exile. Phoumi had also offered to resign if someone else could be found to lead anti-Communist forces in Laos. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–1461)
3. In telegram 030422Z from Honolulu, January 3, CINCPAC stated that cutting military aid would cause the United States as much harm as it would the RLG. It could undermine an eventual neutralist solution and encourage Pathet Lao and Kong Le’s forces, who continued to receive Soviet bloc military supplies, to assume the offense. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: Cables, 1/4/63–1/6/62)
4. In this telegram, the Chief of MAAG indicated that a cut-off of U.S. military aid to the RLG would require 30 to 45 days before the impact was felt. The Lao Air Force could continue operations for at least 60 days with its petroleum, oil, and lubricants on hand. The MAAG Chief stated that calling in U.S. Military Training Teams should be a last resort since it would demoralize FAR and destroy good U.S.–FAR relations. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/1–262)
5. In telegram 924, January 2, Brown reported that Boun Oum informed him that the RLG Cabinet agreed to send no message to Souvanna about future meetings of the three Princes. While he thought a resumption of hostilities unlikely, Brown asked for authority to suspend military supplies and withdraw U.S. military advisers should Phoumi initiate the fighting. (Ibid.)