252. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State0
916. Ref: Embtel 915.1 For Assistant Secretary Harriman from Ambassador Brown.
When I left Phoumi after talk reported reftel Phoumi asked Hasey to call before afternoon Cabinet meeting, which Hasey did at 1600.
Phoumi said he was too deeply shocked by defeatist policy of US to carry on. US was treating RLG like a small child, saying just give in here (concede Souvanna only Prime Minister-designate) and then a little more here (do Souvanna work for him to form a govt) and then final [Page 552] straw (Defense and Interior for Souvanna). US policy is completely downhill into communism.
Phoumi said “I could not tell your Ambassador but I want you to prepare him for the worst. I do not believe I can swing the Cabinet. It will be interpreted as complete capitulation.” Hasey told Phoumi that Ambassador had specific instructions and they are drastic. He urged Phoumi to do his best and understand that he had a lot to gain at the conference table but he must make up his mind that Defense and Interior would go to Souvanna group.
Phoumi said he was sure Cabinet would refuse to concede these two posts. He also said King would insist Defense and Interior remain with RLG. He said King had intimated this to Ambassador at last audience. (Comment: I have no recollection of this.) Hasey told Phoumi that if a message as suggested by me were not sent he risked losing US support. Phoumi said that he realized this but he really didn’t see much use in US support if all it meant was giving in to the enemy.
Phoumi said “We will just ask you to leave with your support.” The govt will resign and turn power over to King or National Assembly. They will have authority to negotiate with Souvanna. Either that or turn authority over to Souvanna and say “It is all yours and your Soviet friends. Laos is now Communist.”
Phoumi said Boun Oum will never accept this. Be careful, Phoumi warned, that Boun Oum doesn’t go back to “his” policy of secession. People like Bounpone, Kot, any many other military will go with him.
Hasey asked Phoumi what he would do. He said he didn’t know yet but he would not join Boun Oum’s movement. He thought he would leave the country. He said he was sending his wife and children to Savannakhet to “pack their bags.” Also he said that he will not be caught again (like August 1960) without any money in the south.
Hasey urged Phoumi to be reasonable. He replied US is not being reasonable with RLG and their desire to keep Laos from going Communist.
Hasey asked to see Phoumi after Cabinet meeting but he said “You have the answer. I’ll give it to your Ambassador tomorrow afternoon.” Comment: It appears that the US position has now fully been comprehended by Phoumi. His reaction is understandable.
At my request Hasey informed Boun Oum this morning privately of risk of losing US support if RLG not willing cede Defense and Interior to center provided other portfolio distribution satisfactory.
I think it wise to let things simmer overnight.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–3161. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Geneva for Fecon, priority to London and Paris, and to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, CINCPAC for POLAD, Moscow, and New Delhi.↩
- In telegram 915, December 31, Brown reported on a conversation with Phoumi and noted that Phoumi was concerned about his ability to win acceptance from the rest of the Royal Lao Government for a coalition government even given the concessions that Brown believed Souvanna had made. (Ibid.)↩