Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

251. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State⁰

Vientiane, December 30, 1961, 10 p.m.

912. For Assistant Secretary Harriman from Ambassador Brown. Ref: Embtel 911.¹

Phoumi fully confirms account his conversation with Souvanna contained reftel. He plans send message to Souvanna Monday January 1. Contents this message will be decided tomorrow morning. I congratulated him on concessions he had obtained from Souvanna in composition of center. He agreed this considerable advance. He is prepared advise Souvanna he ready discuss allocation positions of Defense and Interior in context total distribution of portfolios. He said his colleagues very tough on retaining Defense and Interior in Vientiane, but he would try persuade them. He said Souvanna had even indicated he might give Phoumi Interior. I said I thought this most unlikely in view attitude Souphanouvong. Phoumi said he had final fall-back position of Souvanna as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense with Phoumi as Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Defense. Phoumi clearly would rather have posts of Defense and Interior divided between PL and RLG than to have both in hands of weak center. He said he had suggested to Souvanna that if Vientiane could have these two posts PL could have either two to balance them but Souvanna had objected to PL having any key posts.

Phoumi said he was ready to have Souvanna and Souphanouvong return to Vientiane and meet “a six” with their advisors.

I said that RLG had been placed in extremely bad position by Boun Oum’s presenting its position in form of ultimatum and stating he would not attend three-Prince meeting and that Zurich and Hin Heup agreements no longer valid. It was important for govt to recoup this position and make clear that it welcomed further three-Prince consultations. I said that I could not too strongly emphasize the importance U.S. attached to resumption of three-Prince discussions and speedy conclusion. Agreements reached at Geneva were considerable achievement and highly valuable for Laos. They had been achieved by great effort. They could not be kept indefinitely in suspense. It was essential that govt be formed quickly. Phoumi said he agreed. I said I hoped his message to Souvanna would clearly state that provided formula of nineteen he had suggested were acceptable, he was prepared to discuss allotment of Defense and Interior in context of total distribution of portfolios. I refined this by saying that I thought he should say that he was prepared to consider yielding Defense and Interior to center if satisfactory agreement reached on distribution of other ministries and secretaryships. In any case, he should make it clear that Souvanna and Souphanouvong were welcome in Vientiane for further three-Prince discussions. Phoumi indicated that he personally was willing at least to say that Defense and Interior were negotiable, although he had more difficulty with the concept of saying that he would yield them both to center if other disposition satisfactory. He still seems to think that Souvanna is on point of yielding on Interior, a belief which I personally consider wholly unfounded. I told Phoumi that in my conversation with Souvanna, after seeing him, Souvanna had still insisted firmly that Defense and Interior both be given center.

Phoumi said he felt that if he had seen Souvanna before he saw the King this morning, Souvanna would have stayed to continue discussions, but having asked King’s permission to leave, he felt he could not do so. I stressed that it was absolutely essential that message sent to Souvanna be such as to induce him to return with Souphanouvong for further discussions. Phoumi agreed.

Phoumi meeting with cabinet 0900 December 31, then attending Diplomatic Corps presentation New Year’s wishes to King. I will see him noon to discuss further proposed reply before it is dispatched January 1.

I would appreciate Dept’s comments on above and on Souvanna’s proposals contained Embtel 911 by 0900 Vientiane time December 31 if possible.²

Brown

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–3061. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Geneva for Fecon, priority to London and Paris, and to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, CINCPAC for POLAD, Moscow, and New Delhi.
1. In telegram 911, December 30, Souvanna told Brown that Phoumi had proposed to him a government of 19 (4 from each wing and a center composed of Souvanna and 5 Xieng Kouang and 5 Vientiane neutrals). Souvanna countered that Defense and Interior would have to go to the center. Phoumi asked to think about it. Brown also noted: “Souvanna said that in any ministry that had Secretaries of State, if there were a PL minister he would be balanced by Vientiane Secretary of State and vice versa. Deputy Prime Ministers would be Phoumi and Souphanouvong. Each would have a portfolio of his own.” (Ibid.)
2. In telegram 579 to Vientiane, December 30, the Department informed the Embassy that telegram 912 was received after Document 250 was sent. The Department believed that Document 250 covered the questions raised. It also fully agreed with the position that Brown took with Phoumi, particularly opposition as to the division of Defense and Interior between the RLG and the Pathet Lao, which would create a chaotic and dangerous condition. In the Department’s view, the Pathet Lao should be limited to the least sensitive posts possible. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–3061)