Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

254. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State⁰

Vientiane, January 4, 1962, 4 p.m.

937. For Secretary and Assistant Secretary Harriman from Ambassador Brown. Reference: Deptel 585.¹

1) I have no pressures left to use on Phoumi and Boun Oum.

2) I have made all the threats that words alone can convey. Though my words have been general, they have been interpreted as saying aid would be cut off.

3) These threats have been categorically defied, as was the Secretary’s message of November 13.²

4) What we need now is action and action on Phoumi where it hurts and where he still lingeringly hopes we will never desert him, namely in the military field.

5) It will be both futile, and embarrassing for U.S., for me to go to Boun Oum and Phoumi without our having backed up by some action what I have said to them and to King under the firmest instructions from the highest levels in Department.

6) If we did act, we would at least have the inducement of future resumption of aid.

7) Simply stated, if I follow the instructions contained reftel, the U.S. will be shown to the RLG to be in fact a paper tiger and our hope of ever being able to influence Phoumi will be even dimmer than before.

8) If Boun Oum is to be pressed to go to Geneva, it must therefore be done by representatives of the co-chairmen. The U.S. should not go to Boun Oum and Phoumi with a plea without having backed up our former pressures by concrete action.

9) Moreover, I wonder what good will it do, except perhaps gain some time, to get Boun Oum/Phoumi to Geneva if (a) they won’t yield on the central point; i.e., Interior and Defense to center, and (b) we and Souvanna persist in our position that both Defense and Interior must go to center. Phoumi and Boun Oum will not concede both posts to center without a show of force by the U.S. demonstrated by action, if indeed they do agree.

10) I therefore repeat my recommendation in Embtel 932³ and strongly recommend that in the absence of such action by the U.S. pressures on Phoumi and Boun Oum to go to Geneva should be left to representatives of co-chairmen.

Brown

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–462. Secret; Niact; Urgent. Repeated niact to Geneva for Fecon, priority to London, Paris, CINCPAC for POLAD, and to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Saigon.
1. In telegram 585, January 3, the Department informed Brown that a cable from Sullivan in Geneva (Confe 994, January 3; ibid., 751J.00/1–362) described a campaign by Pushkin to have the 1954 Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, invite the three Princes to meet in Geneva. The Department had instructed Sullivan to support the idea; and in telegram 585 to Vientiane it instructed Brown to use all pressures to get Phoumi and Boun Oum to accept the invitation when issued. (Ibid.)
2. Document 227.
3. Document 253.