Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

190. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, September 28, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Weekly Summary, Geneva Conference, September 18–24, 1961

1. Ambassador Harriman’s Mission

a. Royal Audience.¹ King Savang expressed appreciation for the President’s message. He voiced grave misgivings, however, over acceptance of Souvanna but indicated that as constitutional monarch he would designate him Prime Minister if requested jointly by the three Princes who he agreed with Harriman should meet again promptly. Savang’s own choice for Premier was Phoui Sananikone. In the event of partition of his country, the King said he would abdicate. While he regretted no solution had been found at the audience, he hoped the Free World, by remaining flexible yet determined and prepared to fight if required, would win out.

b. Phoumi Nosavan.² Harriman deduced from talking with Phoumi that the latter was not prepared to negotiate in good faith with Souvanna and still counted on U.S. backing of any military action he might choose to undertake. At Ambassador Brown’s suggestion we have authorized him to make clear to Phoumi that he must negotiate seriously or risk losing our support. Brown has come back asking for more specific instructions, including at what point and on what basis we would withdraw such support to Phoumi. The Department is now studying this problem and its implications.

c. Diem, Sarit, Thai King, SEATO, Nehru.³ As anticipated, President Diem and Marshal Sarit were skeptical of Souvanna’s ability to maintain a genuinely neutral posture. Sarit did accept Harriman’s suggestion that the Thai at Geneva adopt greater flexibility on issues of lesser importance. The Thai King was responsive to Harriman’s visit; he was concerned over the Communist threat to Thailand and stressed the need for a constructive socio-economic program in Laos to wean the population away from the Communists. There were few comments from the SEATO Council representatives who in restricted session heard Harriman’s analysis of the Lao situation and his mission to Southeast Asia. Finally, Harriman reported that though there were no concrete results from his meetings with Nehru and other key Indian officials, he felt the time had been usefully spent in that the Indians now appeared to understand our position on Laos more fully. Desai in particular had been unrealistic in his appraisal of Souphanouvong and Souvanna, considering the latter much stronger than his half-brother.

2. Addis-Souvanna Meeting⁴

At our request, British Ambassador Addis met with Souvanna on September 22 to convince him of the necessity of a broad center group in any coalition government. Addis deduced that Souvanna was principally motivated by his desire to reward his “faithful cohorts” by giving them portfolios, rather than by obedience to Communist or Pathet Lao directives. He therefore personally suggested a new 4–7–4–4 formula to Souvanna: 4 Pathet Lao, 7 Souvanna/Xieng Khouang “moderates,” 4 non-Xieng Khouang moderates, 4 Phoumi-Boun Oum. Souvanna was not enthusiastic but agreed to consider the proposal if the King were to designate the 4 non-Xieng Khouang center elements. Addis felt that there was now a faint possibility of success on this major issue.

3. Geneva⁵

Under the new procedure, the two Geneva Co-Chairmen agreed bilaterally on five items, three on Pushkin’s list and two others involving Western withdrawal of proposed drafts. Progress was also achieved in negotiating new drafts bearing on the Co-Chairmen’s role and ICC equipment. Pushkin, however, was angered by alleged Western dilatoriness and refused to hold the restricted session set for September 22 for discussion of the five items. He calmed down on learning that we were ready to accept his draft on war prisoners and the session was anticipated for September 25. MacDonald believes Pushkin is under Moscow pressure to obtain a settlement by the end of this month and also has been under criticism from the Chinese for not securing Western agreement to his drafts on ICC and war prisoners.

LDB

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 9/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
1. See footnote 3, Document 184.
2. See Document 185.
3. An account of Harriman’s discussion with Diem and other South Vietnamese officials is in telegram 431 from Saigon, September 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2161) A report of Harriman’s discussion with Sarit is in telegram 444 from Bangkok, September 22. (Ibid., 751J.00/9–2261) An account of Harriman’s meeting with the SEATO Council Representatives in Bangkok is in telegram 447 from Bangkok, September 22. (Ibid., 370/9–2261) The report on the discussion with Nehru is in telegram 901 from New Delhi, September 22. (Ibid., 751J.00/9–2261)
4. A more detailed report is in Confe 661 from Geneva, September 26. (Ibid., 751J.00/9–2661)
5. This summary is taken from the weekly evaluation of the Laos Conference in Confe 655 from Geneva, September 23. (Ibid., 751J.00/9–2361)