Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

189. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, September 26, 1961, 4 p.m.

Confe 660. Dept for President. From Harriman. Department’s excellent instructions (Deptel 287 to Vientiane)¹ provide basis for Ambassador Brown to impress upon Phoumi that he must negotiate sincerely with Souvanna, if he is to continue to receive our support.

We believe it impossible answer questions raised by Amembassy Vientiane,² as answers would have to be related to sincerity of negotiations which Phoumi has been carrying on. There are so many variants that it impractical for US Government to provide in advance answers to all of them. One possibility which I explored with Allen Dulles is to find substitute general to replace Phoumi if he remains intransigent. The more I see of Phoumi, the less I trust him as US chosen instrument to carry out faithfully our agreed policies and objectives now or later. Recommend this subject be pursued further urgently to analyze alternatives and be prepared to act promptly if need be. We will simply have to determine for ourselves whether Phoumi is in fact negotiating in good faith.

Conversations reported by Sen (Vientiane’s 26)³ with respect to various possible formulas for composition of new government give us a basis for arriving at some workable arrangement. If we were to work on the basis of a total figure of 20 there is possibility of juggling the component groups around in such a way as to get as many places as nine or possibly 10 for the RLG and non-Xieng Khouang neutral groups. Cabinet of 20 makes it possible to take care of Souvanna’s followers in Xieng Khouang and still have adequate outside representation.

Referring to Brown’s observation that we can never be fully effective with Phoumi unless and until we have decided to support Souvanna, I feel that if Phoumi negotiates sincerely with Souvanna from present fairly strong position (after all Souvanna knows that Phoumi can cause hostilities to start again in which event either (1) PL will win country; (2) RLG will get US SEATO support with division of country. In either event Souvanna will be out.), Phoumi can get better terms for himself and perhaps non-Xieng Khouang groups than will be possible if we have to do all the negotiating ourselves or through other channels.

It is of course not yet possible for us to make decision to support Souvanna because he has not yet met all our conditions. It is by standing firmly upon our conditions and negotiating sincerely and toughly with Souvanna that Phoumi can obtain best results. If Phoumi refuses to negotiate sincerely it will be necessary to negotiate with Souvanna directly or through other channels to find a basis upon which we can support him and then present Phoumi with fait accompli. However, this is much less preferable course, and one which I hope we will not have to follow. On the other hand, I see no objection to encouraging exploratory discussion such as Addis and Sen have recently had.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2261. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN for the Secretary and to Vientiane eyes only for Ambassador.
1. In telegram 287, September 22, the Department instructed Brown to “convey to Phoumi in strongest terms our desire that he negotiate sincerely with Souvanna Phouma and that he agree to participate in early meeting three Princes.” Brown was authorized to state that there was an “unequivocal position decided at the highest level” not to support Phoumi if further hostilities resulted from his failure to negotiate. (Ibid.)
2. In telegram 507 from Vientiane, September 25, Brown asked questions about these instructions: if Phoumi refused to negotiate in good faith and the enemy attacked would the United States not support him, or would support be denied only if Phoumi initiated the attack? What did refusal to support mean: no introduction of U.S. troops, withdrawal of MAAG advisers, cut-off of munitions? Brown also observed that it would be difficult to determine who was responsible for a major attack. Brown concluded that the United States could never be fully effective with Phoumi until it decided to support Souvanna Phouma and until it told Phoumi so. (Ibid., 751J.00/9–2561)
3. The reference is in error and should be to telegram 512 from Vientiane, repeated to Geneva as 326, September 25, in which the Embassy reported a conversation with ICC Chairman Sen who gave the impression that both Souvanna and Souphanouvong were receptive to modifications of the formula for composition of a Souvanna-led center government. (Ibid.)