Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

188. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, September 26, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Southeast Asia Planning

1. The planning for Southeast Asia, which has been pointing to a conclusion by the end of the rainy season, is coming to a head but will not be ready for presentation to you this week. Two plans are in process of development. The first is an expanded version of SEATO 5 which maximizes the use of Thai and South Vietnamese forces.¹ This plan, however, is applicable only to the case of an overt resumption of hostilities.

2. The second plan addresses itself to the case of ambiguous Communist aggression falling outside the scope of SEATO 5.² This is a more difficult situation to meet because of the limited local resources available for the extensive counter-guerrilla action necessary to avoid further loss of ground in Laos and to protect the Thai and South Vietnamese border from further infiltration.

3. The more we study the Southeast Asia problem the more we are convinced of the critical importance of logistic factors. A study of the logistic problem from the point of view of the Communists and ourselves indicates that it sets an upper limit to the possibility of escalation of military action. A recent briefing by the Joint Staff indicates that in the wet season we could support only one more U.S. division in the Mekong Valley beyond the forces presently planned in SEATO 5.³ During the dry season we could bring in a maximum of three additional divisions, but two of these would have to be withdrawn southward into Thailand at the commencement of the wet season. With intensive work on the logistic facilities, we could probably raise the level of support-ability above these figures in a few months after the arrival of our logistic troops.

4. Our ability to support significant numbers of troops in combat ends at the rail-and airheads in the Mekong Valley. Movement beyond the valley into the hinterland of Laos could be supplied only by porters and primitive transport, supplemented by such helicopters as we might introduce. Thus there would be a narrow limit set on the use of SEATO troops in jungle warfare.

5. On the enemy side there are considerably more difficult problems than on ours. We estimate that not more than eight Viet Minh or ChiCom divisions could be introduced into northern Laos, even in the dry season, and of these only four could be supported in combat in the Mekong River area. In the panhandle of Laos, it does not appear logistically feasible for the enemy to reinforce with major units. He could support five to six more divisions in North Vietnam for use against South Vietnam but in this area we also could reinforce.

6. This estimate of the enemy’s eight division reinforcement capability in Laos does not take into account the effect of our air attack on his supply lines which are highly vulnerable. If we took out key points such as Hanoi, Mon Cay and Lao Kay his level of troop support-ability would drop very substantially.

7. A consideration of the foregoing facts leads to the conclusion that the logistics factor does indeed place a definite ceiling upon the size of the war which can be conducted in Southeast Asia. Without much work on the logistic facilities, we could not introduce and support many more troops in Laos and Thailand than those contemplated in SEATO 5. The enemy’s reinforcement capability in this area is so limited that the possibility of ChiCom intervention on the ground tends to lose significance. The principal threat from the Chinese would be the air attack of important targets in Southeast Asia, but our air capability, reinforced by carrier-based aircraft, should be able to hold this threat into manageable proportions.

8. The foregoing considerations do not suggest that military operations in Southeast Asia could be conducted cheaply. Even though the over-all numbers committed would be limited, the requirement for replacements and the effort necessary to improve and expand the logistics base would be costly. However, we are not talking about a war which might approach in size the Korean operation. Nor will we run the risk of being driven off the peninsula as we did in the early days of Korea.

Maxwell D. Taylor

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 9/21/61–9/30/61. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that it was sent to Newport as part of the President’s weekend reading, September 27.
1. Reference is to SEATO Plan 5 Plus, an undated copy of which is in the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Das Buch Laos, T 641–71C. A copy of a draft is attached to a memorandum from Williams to McNamara, I–19078/61, October 2, in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Southeast Asia.
2. Two slightly different drafts of this plan, one drafted by Wood and dated September 26, one undated and without attribution, are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 9/21/61–9/30/61.
3. A summary of the conclusions based on that briefing to Taylor, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, Colonel Ewell, Commander Bagley, and other military officers is ibid., Countries Series, Laos: General, 9/61.