Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

187. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy²

Washington, September 26, 1961.

You have expressed an interest in discussing with Brigadier General William H. Craig, Joint Staff, his recent trip to Southeast Asia.³ Since it appears difficult to get this discussion on your schedule in the near future, I am enclosing a summary of the briefing which he gave my group. You will note the emphasis which he places upon the lack of leadership in the Royal Laotian Army, the increased enemy build-up in the Laotian panhandle, and his feeling of the need of a tough MAAG/Embassy team on the Van Fleet/Peurifoy model.

Maxwell D. Taylor

[Attachment]

⁴

SUMMARY OF BRIEFING BY BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM H. CRAIG, JOINT STAFF, ON HIS TRIP TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. Lack of leadership at all levels is a major deficiency of the FAL. There is no alternative to General Phoumi at the top. He is the only driving force in Laos. However, we must begin to get tough with him; we must insist upon release of incompetent officers and NCO’s. At present, incompetent officers tend to be rewarded and competent ones replaced. Junior officers are not given basic guidance and instruction by their superiors; and there are serious shortages in officer and NCO ranks.

2. The FAL logistic system is totally ineffective and there is an urgent requirement for a “U.S.-directed” logistic system down to battalion level.

3. There are serious deficiencies in training which are only beginning to be remedied by the extensive training program now under way. Fighting often appears to be a kind of chess game with men and artillery pieces as the pawns.

4. Since the beginning of the ostensible cease-fire, the international impression of activities in Laos has been one of stalemate and inactivity. However, the cease-fire did not result in the end of shooting but only in lessened intensity and frequency of operations. The FAL has been engaged in intense training activity, regrouping, reorganization, re-deployment, and small unit combat activity to counter PL/Viet Minh limited offensives and other cease-fire violations. The FAL has established liaison with the armed forces of South Viet Nam, to include South Viet Nam detachments at Savannakhet, Saravane and Attopeu. Phoumi is also in constant contact through liaison officers with Sarit and has discussed his contingency plans with the Thai Chief of Staff.

5. During the cease-fire period the enemy has been engaged in: (a) controlling Phong Saly, Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang; (b) suppressing Meos in the Plaine des Jarres; (c) infiltrating south Laos (most recently in company and battalion size units) along the common border of Laos/Viet Nam; (d) replenishing supplies by aerial and truck convoy operations; (e) recruiting and training the PL, both in Laos and in North Viet Nam; and (f) engaging in patroling and probing actions and hit-and-run raids. On balance, due primarily to extensive Viet Minh cadreing of the Lao units and Communist logistic support, the PL has made greater improvement than the FAL during the cease-fire.

6. The objective of friendly operations has been to hold areas held on May 3 or to retake them if lost, to defend themselves if required, and to take no aggressive action to capture areas not held at the time of the cease-fire. Sweeping and clearing operations have taken place primarily in the provinces of Nam Thai and Saraboury and around the cities of Vientiane and Pakse. Actions by friendly forces to resist Communist probing actions and hit-and-run raids have been carried out in a gingerly fashion and have accomplished very little.

7. The general consensus is that there is a strong possibility that large scale combat will be resumed at the end of the rainy season, with special enemy emphasis on the route into South Viet Nam through Laos. In the face of an armed enemy attack in force, Phoumi can, at best, fight a delaying action for no longer than two or three weeks. However, if the enemy attacks and Phoumi is supported by a multi-national force under SEATO Plan 5 or a suitable variation, he should be able to hold his pres-ent position, carry out extensive guerrilla operations in northeast Laos, clear his rear areas, and continue to improve the combat effectiveness of the FAL.

8. A most significant development with grave implications is the recently increased enemy activity and buildup in the panhandle in the area of Saravane/Attopeu. It is Phoumi’s and Diem’s conviction that the Communists plan to split Laos by a north-south line rather than by an east-west line. Such a split would greatly increase the threat to South Viet Nam.

9. It is Ambassador Young’s view that Sarit will not provide any military units or significantly increased cadres for the FAL without introduction of U.S. combat units on the ground. “If the stops were pulled out”, Thailand would most need two ranger battalions now, up to six later; training and equipment for the border police; and integration of a Thai ranger battalion with a U.S. battalion for a joint on-the-ground training.

10. It is Ambassador Nolting’s view that we need a military plan big enough so that it will work; that we should not take half-way measures. It is also his view that, if a Souvanna Phouma government is formed, the gate will be opened to the Communists and South Viet Nam will go down fighting.

11. Diem considers a general attack by North Viet Nam to be imminent. McGarr believes that the recently approved 30,000 man increase in the GVN army will provide a limited capability for defense against an attack across the Lao border. Very small forces, if any, could be spared now for action in Laos. Diem might risk joining a multi-national force in Laos, but only if Western leadership and U.S. air and logistic support is forthcoming at the outset, along with concrete evidence that the West will put in ground troops.

12. Phoumi considers that the most probable enemy course of action will be to infiltrate South Viet Nam through eastern Laos. He does not believe the cease-fire will last beyond September 30. Phoumi indicated that he would accept any help in the form of advisers we could give him and indicated a willingness to accept Thai cadres in advisory and command capacities.

13. We should negate the use of Cambodia and Burma as safe havens and aids to the Communists through use of our unconventional warfare capabilities.

14. General Craig’s team feels that we need in Laos a MAAG-Embassy team of the sort that we had in Greece under Van Fleet and Peurifoy.

15. In conclusion, the team believes that with the end of the rainy season the situation in Laos is now critical; that the future of the U.S. in Southeast Asia is at stake; that the FAL cannot hold back the Communists; and that an immediate decision is urgently required.

16. The recommendations of the team are as follows: (a) take initial steps right now to implement SEATO Plan 5 or a suitable variation in order to get the needed multi-national forces placed in desired positions before the end of the rainy season; (b) simultaneously get tough with Phoumi on leadership and on an effective logistic support system within the FAL; and (c) be prepared to provide Phoumi tactical air support in the event hostilities are resumed.

2. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 9/21/61–9/30/61. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that it was sent to Newport as part of the President’s weekend reading, September 27.
3. See footnote 5, Document 159.
4. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert H. Johnson on September 18.