Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

191. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, September 29, 1961, 8 p.m.

Confe 674. For Rostow White House Eyes Only. Re Department’s 398.¹ From Harriman.

I called on Pushkin this afternoon explaining I had received “good news” from Washington and then took up Rostow-Smirnovsky conversation² point by point. He indicated no knowledge of conversation and said that embassies were not the best informed regarding details of conferences.³

1. Veto in ICC: Up to the present Pushkin has stood firmly on principle unanimity ICC even as late as two days ago at meeting with British, Chinese, and ourselves. Today he said that Soviets would not accept majority procedure but implied they might be willing negotiate some concession to strict unanimity.

2. Veto by Lao Government: After some discussion he agreed to investigation by ICC “in agreement with government” rather than “with agreement by government” as he had argued before. By this he explained that the ICC would not necessarily have to get permission for each investigation providing the investigation was in accordance with general agreement reached between the ICC and the government.

3. It has always been agreed ICC should supervise withdrawal foreign troops obviously including Viet Minh. He admitted that Viet Minh intended to disappear before ICC could investigate and before their presence had to be admitted. Pushkin added: “I assume the same will be true of Thais and South Vietnamese.”

4. Orderly reduction Lao forces: Pushkin recognized that Zurich communique required further agreement between Princes. He stated unequivocally all forces should be integrated and that no private armies—PL or Phoumi—should remain in Laos. He agreed that permanent force should not be large and excess should be demobilized. There has been no proposal tabled for ICC supervision of this demobilization. Pushkin is definitely opposed to ICC having any authority in Lao internal affairs. ICC should deal only with respect to internal aspects. This underlines importance of agreement among Princes amplifying Zurich communique and reference to it in Lao declaration.

5. Transit of Viet Minh through Laos to South Vietnam led to discussion of situation in South Vietnam: Although Pushkin did not deny some Viet Minh had come from North, he maintained that principal trouble in South Vietnam was popular uprising against unpopular Diem regime. He compared Diem to Syngman Rhee and implied that Diem would have the same fate. I of course did not accept his assertions and pointed out that reforms Diem attempting were being prevented by guerrilla interference with village life. I suggested that if we came to a successful conclusion Laos negotiation, it might be well for our governments to attempt to eliminate hostilities between North and South Vietnam. He replied perhaps providing both Vietnam Governments were represented in discussion. Each of us made it plain that neither had authority to discuss this question in Geneva.

I pressed him for agreement on inclusion of our text specifically forbidding transit foreign military personnel. He commented with a smile: “You want to have everything in your pocket this afternoon.” I mention this as conversation was relaxed and in good humor although he was clearly puzzled by the manner of my approach.

In this connection the question of KMTs came up. I again assured him it was the administration’s objective to get rid of them in Laos as well as in Thailand and Burma as it was causing difficulties in our relations with these countries. Pushkin commented that it would be impossible to exaggerate how much the presence of KMTs adversely affected Red China’s attitude towards US.

Incidentally, I had long talk with Pushkin day before yesterday in which I gave him reasonably frank report of my talks with Souvanna and others in SEA.

Pushkin asserts that we can come to final agreement Geneva before formation Union Government. I have maintained this would be violation Lao sovereignty and we could not finally reach agreement without Lao Government participation.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2961. Top Secret. Repeated to USUN Eyes Only for the Secretary.
1. In this telegram, September 28, the Department informed Harriman of the substance of the Rostow-Smirnovsky discussion of that day. (Ibid., 751J.00/9–2861)
2. Rostow met Mikhail N. Smirnovsky, the new Minister Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, who had been Pushkin’s assistant, for a discussion which lasted for an hour and a half. (Memorandum of conversation, September 28; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 9/61)
3. On October 3, Harriman met Soviet Ambassador Menshikov in Washington for an inconclusive discussion on Laos. When Harriman asked Menshikov about the Rostow-Smirnovsky talk, Menshikov asked Smirnovsky to come in. Smirnovsky stated that his discussion with Rostow was on his own initiative and without specific instructions. In reply to a question from Harriman, Smirnovsky stated that he told Rostow nothing that Pushkin had not told Harriman. (Memorandum of conversation between Harriman and Menshikov, October 3; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/61)