Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia⁰

Washington, September 12, 1961.

312. Eyes Only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. Embtel 438.¹

Suggest that in further conversations on Laos you put emphasis on aspect withdrawal foreign military personnel and verification thereof.

FYI We believe that if a withdrawal of foreign military personnel could really be accomplished it would be to our net advantage. However, as you know, there is serious problem means whereby particularly Viet-minh personnel can be identified, located and withdrawal verified as compared with ease with which withdrawal of American personnel may be verified. There is also problem of French military training personnel. We have at Geneva put forward and do not yet want to abandon principle that French training mission may, in accordance with 1954 Geneva Agreements remain in Laos. Soviets have not yet accepted although their agreement to French training mission under 1954 accord remains valid. Therefore to extent possible suggest you attempt finesse question of French presence unless and until raised by Soviets, concentrating rather on American, and if Soviets raise question, Thai personnel. We feel that control organization should remain indefinitely as internationally agreed protection to neutrality of Laos and as assurance to both sides that foreign military personnel are not re-introduced into Laos or that territory of Laos is used by either side for un-neutral purposes. (FYI We have in mind Viet-minh use of Laos to flank 17th parallel for attacks on South Viet-Nam which it unlikely any Lao government would be able to prevent.) As stated my tel 274² we perceive no method whereby such verification may be obtained, except with ICC with satisfactory terms of reference, but are willing to listen to any other Soviet suggestions. (FYI Some UN observation mechanism would of course be acceptable to us as alternative to ICC but presume Soviets would not consider. There is also perhaps possibility of two co-chairmen, Soviets and UK, constituting observation teams but this has obvious difficulties and complications and we would not now want to propose. Therefore suggest that while you might in passing and orally mention UN possibility you generally concentrate on ICC as preferred mechanism and if Soviets oppose continue attempt elicit any further suggestions they may have. We must, of course, avoid trap in which we withdraw and Viet-minh continue to be left largely free hand.)³

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1261. Top Secret. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and approved by Rusk. The time of transmission is illegible.
1. See footnote 3, Document 175.
2. Document 175.
3. In telegram 287 from Belgrade, September 14, Kennan informed Rusk that the Soviet Ambassador had not yet received answers to the questions put to him about Laos, but that he did make two points on September 13 that seemed to reflect guidance from Moscow. First, the Soviets were troubled over the precedent which might be established by a neutral Laos with its borders under international control. Secondly, the Soviet Union did not deny the need for a control organ, but perhaps it should be composed of countries not involved in Laos. When Kennan inquired whether the Chinese would abide by any agreements on Laos, the Soviet Ambassador replied that they were in no position to make trouble and would accept Soviet leadership. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1461)