Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

177. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, September 8, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Weekly Summary, Geneva Conference, August 28–September 3, 1961

1. In the face of Souvanna’s unsatisfactory response to Ambassador Falaize on August 27, we decided it was imperative that we ourselves frankly discuss with the Prince the conditions he must be prepared to fulfill to warrant our support of a national union government under his leadership.¹ Therefore, despite expressed misgivings of the French and British, we have asked Souvanna to meet with Ambassadors Harriman and Brown in Paris, or secondarily in Phnom Penh. No reply has thus far been received. Over the weekend, Ambassador Harriman engaged in talks with the UK Government on all aspects of the Lao problem and returns to Geneva this week.² In the meantime, Ambassador Addis is also seeking a rendezvous with Souvanna at Phnom Penh, but has indicated he will go to Xieng Khouang if necessary.

We have instructed our Ambassadors in Bangkok and Saigon to set forth to Sarit and Diem respectively our purpose in approaching Souvanna and the steps we are taking to bolster the RLG’s military posture.³ In addition, Mr. Johnson is consulting with the representatives of the SEATO powers on contingency plans in the event that all efforts at a peaceful settlement fail and the Communists renew the offensive. These plans essentially call for an extension of SEATO Plan 5, i.e., military operations to clear Southern Laos of Pathet Lao elements.

2. At Geneva, the majority of the draft texts pertaining to the powers of the ICC have been debated and either sent to the Drafting Committee or held in suspense. The remaining items may require one more week of discussion.

Since no united Lao government can now be expected before the negotiating phase begins, the Conference may well reach a stalemate. In that event, rather than risk a definite breakdown, we would prefer a recess so that the negotiating channels may remain open. The atmosphere at Geneva, however, is now considerably less optimistic than it had recently been, partly as a result of the Soviet posture on Berlin and resumption of nuclear testing,⁴ partly because of the danger of renewed hostilities in Laos with the forthcoming advent of the dry season.

L.D. Battle⁵

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 9/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
1. Instructions for Harriman’s discussions with Souvanna are in telegram 1094 to London, August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–228)
2. Instructions for Harriman’s discussions with the British in London are in telegram 1093 to London, August 31. (Ibid.) An account of Harriman’s discussions in London, September 3, are in telegram 956 from London, September 5. (Ibid., 751J.00/9–561)
3. In telegram 283 to Bangkok, sent also to Saigon as 269, September 2. (Ibid., 751J.00/9–261)
4. On August 30, the Soviet Union announced that because of the aggressiveness of the United States and NATO, especially over Germany, it was resuming atmospheric nuclear tests notwithstanding their harmful effects. Text of the statement is in Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 337–348.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Melvin S. Manfull signed for Battle.