Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

176. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State⁰

Bangkok, September 7, 1961, 5 p.m.

345. Brown, Nolting and I have had useful discussions on our mutual problems in light timely information from Washington.

US policy towards Laos seems to be approaching a point of decision as to whether we can achieve a satisfactory political settlement establishing a unified and neutral Laos (to be pursued by Amb Harriman in further discussions with Souvanna Phouma) or whether we will have to engage in a possible military campaign for which contingency planning is to be discussed with Diem and Sarit.

We have devoted much of our discussion to the advantages and disadvantages of a possible third alternative—namely, to delay a clearcut political settlement, to let the present cease-fire continue as long as it will to make a de facto division, and meanwhile to pursue contingency military planning.

In presenting our views we have found it necessary to give separate analyses.

1. Laos. The concept on which we are operating is that a genuinely neutral Laos with a modest internal security force and adequate international control machinery will bring peace and some stability to Laos, keep it from going Communist, and thereby act as a buffer between Communist China and North Viet Nam on one side and SVN and Thailand on other. The Communist strategy is doubtless to get US military out of Laos by agreeing to a neutralist govt under Souvanna, to keep the PL in being as a separate force to the maximum extent possible and to work through subversion, infiltration and propaganda to have such a govt replaced through elections by one leaning more to their side. So far as Laos is concerned we are prepared to meet this challenge. If Paris conditions are substantially met we should have a chance of winning the elections and maintaining a middle of the road govt.

Question however arises, how far such govt could reasonably be expected, under Laotian conditions and with limited resources at its disposal, to make Laos an effective barrier to persistent infiltration across its territory into SVN and probably also Thailand. It is logically responsibility of a neutral govt to prevent its territory from being used as base or means of aggression by one neighbor against another. International law would require refusal of transit to any form of belligerent armed forces. A truly neutral Lao Govt would wish honor these obligations. Question is, how far could it actually do so?

It difficult to answer this question categorically, but there reason to doubt whether it could, at least at outset. For first months after its inauguration, the new govt will certainly be concentrating all its resources on getting itself firmly established, on restoring calm and security in its territory, in shaking down its reorganized civil administration and army and preparing for elections. It will have little of either energy or resources available to tackle tough job of sealing off Ho Chi Minh Trail or other avenues of infiltration into SVN or Thailand. There little reason believe that Commies will relax their efforts in this field. There is much evidence to contrary.

Therefore, although new govt should, and may, be quite willing cooperate in this task, it only realistic to recognize that while with assistance of ICC it may be able to make infiltration more difficult, it unlikely be really effective in physically preventing it, certainly in first few months of its life. Task, in fact, may well be beyond exclusive capability of any Lao Govt equipped only with ten to twenty thousand-man internal security force to police entire country.

(On this point Brown would wish to consult with his military advisers in Vientiane before reaching definite conclusion.)

2. Free Vietnam. Our policy, backed by substantial commitment, is to assure survival of Vietnam as free and independent country and to strengthen its viability as such. GVN’s principal military problem as it relates to Laos is how prevent Communist infiltration in such cumulative strength as to wash out progress beginning to be made in internal anti-guerrilla fight. Control of Laotian-SVN border, with help from Laotian Govt, may well be critical element in GVN’s military endeavor. Continued or increased infiltration by Communist bands from Laos into SVN could result in: a) the proclamation of a Communist “liberation govt” in western Vietnam territory, providing an excuse for open support by Communist countries; b) strengthening of existing Viet Cong forces SVN to point that Viet Cong might regain the military offensive; c) prolongation of situation of military stalemate which likely to result in political or military upheaval against GVN. Thus, factor of border control seems critical to chances of GVN’s success, especially over next year to eighteen months. While same problem arises to certain degree with respect to Cambodian-GVN border, this problem must be handled separately.

3. Thailand. Our program help Thais lessen their vulnerabilities will be counteracted to danger point and possibly nullified especially if Laos access corridors quickly exploited by Commies. There already heavy pressure from Russians on RTG to weaken its ties with US and SEATO. If settlement in Laos is unfavorable this pressure likely be increased and policies of Sarit’s regime replaced by policy of middle ground of two-door diplomacy. Also some possibility Sarit and other would be forced out. Establishment of an unfriendly Laotian Govt (Souvanna Phouma would be regarded by Thais as unfriendly) would greatly increase subversive efforts in Thai Govt circles among the elite, etc. As Sarit and Thanat often tell me, substantial infiltration of armed groups and subversive activities all along vulnerable border areas in north and northeast Thailand would result from establishment of a neutral Laotian Govt. In Thai view French military mission for Souvanna regime would double Thailand’s jeopardy and deepen Thailand’s trauma. Thailand needs 12 months strengthen anti-subversive counterguerrilla defense. FonMin Thanat Khoman told me Sept 4 that he felt Geneva Conf had achieved very useful purpose in bringing about tacit decision on Laos which leaves crucial Mekong River Valley area in friendly hands without raising obvious difficulties of formal partition. He suggested our play now should be find some way keeping this situation going and avoid any clear-cut decision. In earlier talks Diem and Mau have expressed to Nolting their view that best available alternative in Laos is to reach no clear-cut political solution. Both GVN and Thailand have in mind working with Phoumi to minimize infiltration from Laos. GVN and Phoumi already cooperating to certain degree, and RTG pressing US for joint activities.

Foregoing suggests that from viewpoint our interests in SVN and Thailand it better continue bide time (while perfecting contingency planning against resumption of hostilities by enemy) rather than play for early agreement on coalition govt as contemplated by Ambassador Harriman’s projected visit to Souvanna.

Nolting and I would prefer modified Plan 5 military course of action since, if successful, it would clearly be most effective means of preventing Communist infiltration into SVN and Thailand. If this course not feasible, we conclude that keeping things in state of flux in Laos is least adverse state of affairs for US policy in SVN and Thailand. In event large-scale hostilities resumed by Communist side, contingency military plan should be ready.

Brown is particularly mindful of difficulties involved in reversing engines vis-a-vis Souvanna and also at Geneva as well as difficulties Laotian people in continued state of unrest and national enmity. He slightly less pessimistic than Nolting and myself about possibility of neutral Lao Govt, when firmly established, hoping reduce infiltration and considerably more concerned at likelihood that continuance of present situation may result in the military explosion it is our preference to avoid, brought about in way in which it will not be clearly responsibility of other side. In a condition of continued stalemate and mounting internal unrest and strain which this would involve for Lao, pressures would grow on Phoumi, who is already restless under uncertainty, to precipitate a military decision by forcing the US hand to bring about military solution he really wants. US policy would thus remain to an undesirable extent in Phoumi’s hands. Moreover, Brown thinks that while other side may well not precipitate matters by direct assault on a Mekong center of population which they might consider likely to bring US in, they might well gradually push offensive elsewhere to point where we would feel it desirable to intervene but could not point to a clear enemy aggression to justify such intervention.

Therefore while agreeing that there is considerable ground for anxiety about infiltration, Brown would, before advocating abandonment of our present efforts to expedite political solution, like to examine and be more fully satisfied as to exactly what could be done under a condition of continued stalemate to inhibit infiltration. Phoumi for example is doing little to help SVN and nothing so far as we know to help Thailand this point, how far similar measures would be practicable or likely under a neutral govt with such help as ICC could provide, and what additional counter measures that the Thai and SVN Govts would be able to take.

Brown [Young?]

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–761. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to London for Harriman, Paris, Saigon, Vientiane, Geneva for Fecon, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC POLAD.