Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia⁰

Washington, September 5, 1961, 8:04 p.m.

274. Eyes Only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. Embtels 359 and 400.¹

Approve your proposed reply on Berlin as contained Embtel 400. FYI. Thompson expects to see Gromyko shortly about his attendance UNGA and tentative soundings on attitudes toward negotiations on Germany and Berlin. Believe your channel should be kept open but not developed on Berlin at this point. End FYI.

With respect to Laos, apart from whether words mean same thing to both sides, problem is translating broad principles into action. Suggest pressing him on whether “all foreign forces and military advisers” include Viet Minh and ChiComs to extent they may be present. Also note apparent omission from Soviet statement of any method verifying withdrawal of foreign military elements, including Viet Minh. We perceive no method whereby satisfactory verification could be obtained by both sides except by ICC with satisfactory terms of reference. If Soviets have any other suggestions we would be glad to hear them.

We do not understand reference to establishment of neutral Laotian Government being impeded by certain elements within Laos. As previously stated, we are prepared to support Souvanna as Prime Minister on basis genuine neutrality but thus far Souvanna ideas on composition of Government appear to be far from neutral. Our efforts with Souvanna are directed at attempt encourage and support him in forming genuinely neutral Government. We hope Soviets would be willing work towards same end.²

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–461. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson and approved by the Secretary.
1. In these two telegrams, September 4 and 5, Ambassador Kennan reported on his successful attempt to set up the separate channel of communication between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev on Berlin and Laos via the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia. Commenting on the initial results of the exchange, Kennan suggested that the Soviets expected the channel to be a continuation of the Vienna summit talks, a strictly bilateral communication involving no obligation of consultation or information with either side’s allies. (Ibid., 396.1–BE/9–261 and 762.00/9–461, respectively) In a 10-page memorandum on both Laos and Berlin, described in telegram 400 from Vientiane, the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to work with the United States for a neutral Laos, hinted that it could influence the Pathet Lao toward that end, and intimated that the United States should do the same with the conservative forces in Laos.
2. In telegram 438 from Belgrade, September 7, Kennan reported that he had met with his Soviet colleague on the evening of September 6 and put to him the questions as cited in this telegram. As far as Laos was concerned, the Soviet Ambassador promised to try to obtain the answers and said it was his understanding that the Soviet Union considered Chinese and Viet Minh armed personnel as foreign troops to be removed. (Ibid., 762.00/9–761)