145. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy0
The current situation with respect to Southeast Asia is stated below. Summary back-up material follows. The relevant tabs are indicated in the text of the situation report.
1. Laos Conference.
- —The procedural bottleneck has been broken and negotiations on both neutrality and ICC controls now begin in Geneva (Tab A). Alexis Johnson and I believe it most unlikely that we shall get a reasonably satisfactory resolution until the other side is convinced we will fight rather than accept a fake settlement.
- —The three Princes are not yet in serious negotiation. Phoumi seems to find it difficult to pursue the middle course we want between appeasing the Communists and starting up the war again (Tabs B and C). At the moment, the King is Phoumi’s main negotiating gambit (Tabs [Page 316] D and E). It seems doubtful that we can escape Souvanna, unless the Geneva show breaks down (Tabs F and G).
- —The Indians have been difficult in Geneva (Tabs H and I); and we are putting pressure on Nehru to strengthen Indian support for the Laos ICC (Tabs J and K).
- —A military contingency plan for Laos exists (Tab L); and up to a point we have agreement with the British (Tab M). The Australians are distinctly tougher than the British (Tab N). Further Pentagon staff work, which would link contingency planning in Laos to contingency planning in Viet-Nam and Thailand, is under way at General Taylor’s instigation (Tab O).
[Here follows discussion of Vietnam and Cambodia.]
5. Organization. John Steeves has been assigned to prepare a brief paper on the key issues for decision in Southeast Asia as a whole; and this paper should be the initial working basis for a Southeast Asia interdepartmental group which General Taylor and I have been trying to get established. A first draft of the Steeves paper will be ready at about Wednesday, July 26.
6. Issues for Decision and Action.
As of now these appear to be the issues which are likely to arise soon for your decision:
- —What are our sticking points in the diplomacy of the Laos Conference?
- —How far can we push the Indians to take the ICC issue in Laos seriously?
- —Shall we push Phoumi into a Souvanna-led government; what are the prospects for getting a Souvanna government with a strong authentically neutralist center?
- —Should we play for a split Laos?
- —Should our military contingency planning for Laos be revised, with lighter weight in the Mekong Valley and a greater direct threat to North Viet-Nam? (Technically, this involves a judgment as to where we meet the extra Vietminh thrust, should we go in. Politically, this depends on surfacing soon, on the international level, North Viet-Nam aggression against South Viet-Nam.)
- —How shall we respond to the Staley Report?
- —Should we raise soon—at our (or Diem’s) initiative—the question of North Viet-Nam aggression, on an international level?
- —Pending the outcome of the Laos exercise, how can we reassure the Thais?
- —How should military contingency planning for Laos and Viet-Nam be related?
These are among the key issues for the agenda of a Southeast Asia Interdepartmental Group whose creation should not be much further delayed.
[Page 317]I would add that a military mission to Viet-Nam, headed by General Taylor, is an urgent item of business. We are flying blind on many important matters, including the quality and vitality of the MAAG in Saigon. General Taylor has indicated a willingness to undertake this assignment when he feels confident that orderly planning is under way on Southeast Asia as a whole.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia, Rostow Report, 2d Try, I. Top Secret. This was Rostow’s revision of Document 141, which the President had refused to read. The tabs were retyped, relettered, and sometimes extracted, but they remain basically the same as those to that document.↩