Office of the Historian

141. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy0

Washington, July 21, 1961.

The situation with respect to Southeast Asia is, essentially, as follows.

1.

The Laos Conference. The procedural bottleneck has been broken and negotiations are likely to proceed along the lines suggested in Harriman’s cable (Tab A);1 that is, neutrality and controls will be considered together. With respect to the formation of a Laos government, we have Brown’s assessment of the local scene (Tab B).2 Souvanna’s frame of mind is suggested in Tabs B–1, B–2, and B–3.3 Phoumi is evidently a problem, as the State Department appreciates (Tab C).4 Somehow he must be kept from either starting a war on his own or caving in completely. Aside from Phoumi’s behavior, the crucial issue will, of course, be the powers of the ICC in Laos. Here Krishna Menon has been difficult; the Canadians have been stalwart. Their evaluation—urging us to continue patiently pressing the Indians—is in Tab D.5 Several further cables on the Krishna Menon problem are included (Tabs D–1, D–2, D–3).6 Ken Galbraith obviously has his work cut out for him. My own expectation is that the conference will proceed for some time; crucial diplomatic issues will gradually become clearcut, focussed around: the composition of the government and the powers to be granted the ICC. Each side [Page 308] will develop a reserve position based on a split Laos. It may be that at some stage Khrushchev may hold up a solution and try to take his bargaining cards in hand—along with others—to a summit conference. In any case, Alexis Johnson and I agree that a crucial determinant of what we ultimately get will be Khrushchev’s view of our military contingency plan in Southeast Asia and our will to bring it to bear if our minimum conditions are not met. Ken Young, sitting in Bangkok and knowing the extent to which our future relation with Thailand hinges on the outcome of the Laos exercise, filed his own appreciation of the crucial importance of our contingency planning (Tab E).7 The present military contingency plan for Laos is included as Tab F.8

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia.]

5.
Organization. On July 18 General Taylor and I had a long talk with Alexis Johnson on the question of organizing a concerted approach to the Southeast Asia problem. An account of that conversation is included as Tab O.9 In addition, General Taylor left some guidelines at the Pentagon on contingency planning for Southeast Asia (Tab P);10 but these will not be official until the State Department signals its accord. Alexis Johnson tells me he has no objection, but wishes first to review the total position with John Steeves.
6.
Issues for Decision and Action.
  • —What are our sticking points in the diplomacy of the Laos Conference?
  • —How far can we push the Indians to take the ICC issue in Laos seriously?
  • —Shall we push Phoumi into a Souvanna-led government; what are the prospects for getting a Souvanna government with a strong authentically neutralist center.
  • —Should we play for a split Laos?
  • —Should our military contingency planning for Laos be revised, with lighter weight in the Mekong Valley and a greater direct threat to North Viet-Nam? (This depends on surfacing soon on the international level North Viet-Nam aggression against South Viet-Nam.)
  • —How shall we respond to the Staley Report?11
  • —Should we raise soon—at our (or Diem’s initiative)—the question of North Viet-Nam aggression, on an international level?
  • —Pending the outcome of the Laos exercise, how can we reassure the Thais?
  • —How should military contingency planning for Laos and Viet-Nam be related?

These are the key issues which, in my view, should promptly engage a Southeast Asia Task Force, which should now be created—without further delay.

Note: A special Appendix of papers on our dialogue with the British on contingency planning for Laos is the final item in the book.12 On the whole, the British have come along pretty well. You may wish to note, especially, items 5 and 6, plus the forthright assessment of the Australians, item 9.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia, Rostow memo, A–C, 7/21/61. Top Secret. The following handwritten note by Kennedy appears on the top right of this memorandum: “Too difficult to read.” All tabs are ibid., A–C, D–I, J–N, O-Appendix, but the Department of State locations are also supplied where possible in the footnotes below.↩
  2. Document 138.↩
  3. Document 137.↩
  4. Tab B–1 is telegram 7 from Paris, July 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–3161). Tab B–2 is telegram 93 from Paris, July 7. (Ibid., 751J.00/7–761). Tab B–3 is a CIA Field Report TDCS 3/481/073, July 19. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia, Rostow Memo, A–C, 7/21/61) All three indicated that Souvanna was still confident that he could control the Pathet Lao.↩
  5. Document 139.↩
  6. Telegram 49 from Ottawa, July 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–1961)↩
  7. Tab D–1 is Fecon 391 from Geneva, July 15. In it, Harriman reported that, thanks to Menon’s influence, Nehru had sent Diefenbaker a message indicating a serious split between India and Canada on equipping the ICC in Laos. (Ibid., 751J.00/7–1561) Tab D–2 is Fecon 394 from Geneva, July 16. In it, Harriman complained that Menon’s hostility to the United States and his pro-Soviet tendencies threatened to turn Laos into another Munich. (Ibid., 751J.00/7–1661) Tab D–3 is telegram 220 to New Delhi, July 18. In it, Ambassador Galbraith was alerted that he should make representations to Nehru about Menon’s role at Geneva. (Ibid., 751J.00/7–1861)↩
  8. Telegram 57 from Bangkok, July 14; see footnote 7, Document 137.↩
  9. Fourth Revised State-Defense Draft of a memorandum to the President, May 30. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia, Rostow Memo, D–I, 7/21/61)↩
  10. See vol. pp. 223–225.↩
  11. See ibid., Document 101.↩
  12. See United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 11, pp. 182–209.↩
  13. See Document 142.↩