Office of the Historian

140. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on Laos at Geneva0

Washington, July 21, 1961, 8:37 p.m.

Fecon 281. Eyes Only for Harriman from Secretary. Fecon 408.1

Appreciate problems you face re handling future Conference work as you enter phase of serious substantive negotiations. Department is reviewing our position at this juncture and will be cabling our concepts of future strategy Geneva.

In any event however there are a number of factors which dictate against the big five approach.

First, such an arrangement would accord to the ChiComs the very status they have hoped to achieve in this conference—recognition as one of the big powers whose cooperation is necessary to achieve solution of key international problems.

Second, you should not enter into bilateral substantive negotiations with ChiCom reps without further instructions based on situation as it develops. We do not now want to indicate any willingness negotiate substantively with ChiComs, unless and until by their actions in major issues in Laos and elsewhere, ChiComs demonstrate they really interested in reaching solutions outstanding problems.

Third, procedure for negotiating out basic substantive issues in this five power group, which includes ChiComs, would undoubtedly heighten dangerously existing apprehensions Thai, Vietnamese and other friendly Asians concerning our intentions in Southeast Asia.

Fourth, exclusion of neutrals from this forum would deprive US of any moderating influence which they may be inclined or able exercise. If we are to succeed in bringing bloc representatives around to our positions in Conference we will need any help we can get from neutrals.

For foregoing reasons believe you should not pursue big five concept. Recognize difficulty of trying hammer out agreements on substantive issues in group of 14 or 16 delegations. Believe, however, that if we cannot gain acceptance of a committee system, we will just have to accept the awkwardness of working on some kind of committee of the whole or restricted plenary basis.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–2161. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Usher; cleared in draft with Meeker and Robert W. Rinden, Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs; cleared by Chapman, Steeves, U. Alexis Johnson, and Bowles; and approved by Rusk.↩
  2. Reference should be to Confe 408, Document 138.↩