101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom0
5554. Eyes only Ambassadors and Harriman. Ref 5553.2 Deliver following letter from President to Prime Minister soonest:
“My dear Mr. Prime Minister:
“Thank you for your letter of May 26 on the issue of the International Control Commission’s powers.
“I agree that this issue is vital and I have it very much in mind to raise with Khrushchev in the likely event that it will not have been resolved by the Conference.
“Upon reflection, I think that we cannot avoid debating the issue in the Conference during the coming week. Postponement would have a [Page 212] demoralizing effect on some of our friends, especially the Thai and the Vietnamese, and could lead to a strengthening of the Communist view that they have us on the run in Laos. I would not suppose that a joining of the issue in debate among representatives of the Conference would make any talk with Mr. Khrushchev on the matter more difficult, especially if there is indication of neutral support in Geneva for an effectively controlled cease fire.
“Nevertheless, I agree that we should not ourselves break up the Conference on this issue at this time. You and I can discuss this after my talk with Khrushchev. Our present aims in debate at Geneva might be to clarify the issue, to call to public attention the continuing Communist violations of the cease fire, and to build up neutral support.
“Of course, the other side could terminate the Conference or could press military action on the ground despite a Conference in being. Either event would present us with some very serious decisions. If we decide that some military demonstration is required to reestablish negotiations or to support a United Nations call for a cease fire, we believe that SEATO Plan Five could be speedily adapted to that somewhat more limited objective. Regarding your Embassy’s Aide-Memoire of May 25th on contingency planning,3 therefore, we would agree that Admiral Felt and General Hull could profitably discuss possible modifications of Plan Five. I am asking Dean Rusk to see Harold Caccia about terms of reference for the military planners.
“Meanwhile, our delegation in Geneva will keep in closest touch with yours since it is important that we all try to move together on this matter.
Sincerely yours,”
Copy also delivered British Embassy, Washington, May 27. Inform Department time of delivery.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–2761. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by McConaughy, Usher, Rusk, Bundy, and the President in substance. Repeated priority to Bangkok, Vientiane, Moscow, and Geneva Fecon.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 100.↩
- Document 100.↩
- The aide-memoire was attached to a memorandum of conversation, May 25, between Rusk and British Ambassador Caccia. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)↩