Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

146. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)⁰

Washington, July 26, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Reflections on Southeast Asia

Your memorandum to the President¹ summarizing the current situation in Southeast Asia, plus my own re-immersion in the problems of Southeast Asia during the last two days have stimulated the following reflections.

1. You have stated in the first paragraph of your memo for the President your conviction that only if we convince the other side that we will fight can we hope for a satisfactory solution in Geneva. While I believe that there is a real argument for military action to provide the basis for de facto partition of Laos and thus to protect Viet Nam and Thailand, I am less sure that the military actions that are currently under discussion will produce a more satisfactory outcome in Geneva.

The recent SNIE (58–2–61 of July 5)² which assessed the consequences of a VN-Thai-RLG military action to secure the Savannakhet-Tchepone-Lao Bao line and a Plan 5 operation involving the U.S., Thai, Lao and Meo troops concluded that such military actions would not “exert any significant pressure on the Communists to become more reasonable at Geneva.” The estimate also assessed the effects of a U.S. air attack upon the DRV (though not possible occupation of Hanoi/Haiphong), but does not explicitly estimate the effects of such action against the DRV on Geneva. It does suggest the strong likelihood of a Bloc military response to such action (see Par. 4 below) and therefore implicitly casts some doubt on the likelihood that it would make the Communists more amenable at Geneva. I think we need a specific intelligence judgment on the effect on Geneva of action against Hanoi/Haiphong if we go for this type of military action.

2. I continue to be quite concerned by what may come out of the discussion between the Princes and by what Phoumi’s real intentions may be. I have the feeling that in this area we are playing out a drama that we have not closely related to our basic objectives and which contains real dangers to their achievement. Souvanna wants a government with a 3–6–3 PL-Souvanna-RLG composition. We are prepared at most to accept a government that has no more than two PL or Souvanna ministers plus Souvanna himself. It seems to me that our hopes are quite unrealistic and that we are either going to have to accept a Communist-dominated government or, what is more likely, accept the breakdown of these negotiations.³

Phoumi’s purposes in the negotiations are unclear, but they seem to contemplate stretching the negotiations out at least to October when the monsoons will be over and when he believes Souvanaphong may choose to reopen hostilities if he has not otherwise achieved his objectives. Do we share Phoumi’s specific objectives in this regard? Shouldn’t we attempt to reach agreement with him on this aspect of his strategy? Should timing here of a breakdown in these talks—so far as we can control it—be related to timing of other moves under the new SEA plan being prepared by Steeves? Would it be useful to have an intelligence estimate of the likelihood that Phoumi may cave in or that he may resume military action unilaterally?

3. This matter of timing raises another interesting and difficult question. It has been your view that the Communists may choose to face us with a double crisis—one in Berlin and one in Southeast Asia. As you know from my prior comment, I am somewhat skeptical as to whether Khrushchev does indeed desire a double crisis. It would present him with problems of crisis management that would in some respects be graver than our own for he must be worried about the intentions of his Chinese ally while he is preoccupied in Europe. If my view is correct we may be faced by a situation where the Communists will set the timetable for one crisis (Berlin) and we will have much greater control over the timetable for the other (SEA).

If this is the case, do we not need to determine whether, considering our own capabilities for crisis management, we wish to have a double crisis? We might be able to get away with a significantly higher level of covert guerilla activity in Southern Laos if Khrushchev was determined not to be provoked. On the other hand, the Chinese might choose to be supersensitive to such activity and use it to justify stepped up Communist activity. Again, it seems to me that it would be useful to have an intelligence estimate dealing with the likelihood that the Soviets would provoke a double crisis and their reaction to new U.S. initiatives in Southeast Asia in the context of a Berlin crisis situation.

4. Finally, on the estimative side I would like to see an intelligence appreciation of the Communist reaction to a U.S. seizure of Haiphong/Hanoi. The SNIE referred to in 1 above states that the lesser action of U.S. air attack on the DRV would almost certainly result in commitment of Soviet and Chinese aircraft to DRV defense, might result in attack on bases from which the U.S. strikes were mounted and concludes with the observation that “We cannot rule out the possibility that Communist China, considering the U.S. action a threat to its security, might undertake major military action in Laos, or even in the Taiwan Strait or Korea.” Presumably, actual occupation would increase the likelihood of this latter type of Chinese reaction.

5. I am rather puzzled by your characterization of the possible need for a change in contingency planning in the penultimate paragraph under Par. 6 on p. 3 of your memo for the President. You speak of giving lighter weight to action in the Mekong Valley and greater weight to a direct threat to North VietNam. You make no direct reference to action in the panhandle of Laos. When I raised a similar point with respect to your memo on the Steeves paper, you indicated that the panhandle operation was covered by reference to the Mekong Valley. But if that is the case here also, do you really want to give lighter emphasis to it? As I have understood your concept, the primary military objective was to secure the panhandle; the primary objective of mounting a threat to Hanoi was one supporting action in the panhandle by deterring massive DRV intervention in Laos. (See Par. 3, v, p. 3 of your memo of June 30 to the President).⁴ Perhaps there has been some slippage during my week away in my understanding of your concept, but I have a feeling that your emphasis has changed somewhat to suggest that the more important purposes of an operation against Hanoi are to reduce DRV intervention in South VietNam and to get the Communists to be more reasonable at Geneva. If these are the objectives, they seem to be less possible of accomplishment than the objective of supporting an effort to achieve de facto partition of Laos. In any event, it seems to me desirable in any discussion of these various possibilities to distinguish explicitly between the Mekong-Plan 5 type activity and activity in the panhandle.

6. Is it your intent (Par. 5 of your memo for the President) that the Steeves paper would be worked over in the proposed SEA task force before it is considered formally by the President or only after Presidential approval? I would favor the former course of action, partly because it is likely to need a good deal of further work after Steeves is done with it, partly because the interested departments ought to have some such opportunity to work on it before the President decides such an important matter. If this procedure is followed, a new intelligence estimate might be cranked up to cover such questions as those I have suggested above as well as other aspects of the plan.

Bob

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia, General: 7/25/61–7/28/61. Top Secret.
1. Document 145.
2. Not printed. (Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99)
3. Johnson added the following marginal note at this point: “The CIA comments of yesterday—into which I am now checking—obviously have a bearing here.” Johnson is apparently referring to comments made at an interdepartmental meeting, July 25; see Document 144.
4. Paragraph 3, v, of the memorandum from Rostow to the President, June 30, on alternative strategies in Southeast Asia reads: “plan an operation to defer the introduction of massive Vietminh and Communist Chinese forces into Laos by mounting a potential threat to Hanoi and North Vietnam from the seaward side.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, SEA, 6/1/61–7/20/61)