113. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Laos
PARTICIPANTS
- United Kingdom
- The Rt. Honorable The Earl of Home, Foreign Secretary
- Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
- Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Deputy Under-Secretary of State
- Mr. John Wright, Private Secretary
- Mr. Denis Greenhill, Counselor, British Embassy
- Mr. R.T.D. Ledward, Counselor, British Embassy
- United States
- The Secretary of State
- Mr. George C. McGhee, Counselor
- Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, Assistant Secretary
- Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
- Mr. John J. McCloy, Advisor to the President
- Mr. Alfred Jenkins, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
When the subject turned to Laos, Lord Home described the situation as it had been upon his departure from Geneva. He believed that the cease-fire had been more of a reality since Padong. He expected the Lao caretaker government which might emerge from the meeting of the three Princes in Zurich would make a declaration of Lao neutrality and presumably another declaration that Laos would impose limits on its military establishment. It would then be up to other conference participants to make a declaration supporting and respecting Lao neutrality. The conference would then need to make some reply to the latter declaration concerning control of arms supply. The powers of the International Commission would also be at issue. So far the communists, and to some extent the Indians, had been insisting that whatever powers the Control Commission might have must not infringe upon Lao sovereignty. Lord Home said he had an oral assurance from Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi, however, that the powers should not be so large as to dominate the situation, nor should they be so small as to render the Commission ineffective. Lord Home had told Chen Yi that the main task of the ICC would be to assist Laos to be neutral. In the event of any infringement of the rules, the ICC must have the machinery to tell the [Page 246] world of such infringement and to report to the co-chairmen in such a way that the conference might be reconvened. He believed it might be possible to reach agreement with the communists on sufficient powers for the Commission. If not and the conference broke down, there would be no alternative to moving on to a modified [SEATO] Plan 5c.1
Mr. McConaughy asked which Lao government would be expected to make these declarations. Lord Home said he hoped there would be a coalition government which would make them. The Secretary inquired as to the chances for a coalition government. Lord Home said that Sisouk had given the chances at 6 to 4 against.
The Secretary mentioned that a purpose of Plan 5c was to bring the interested nations back to the conference table. Lord Home said that this had never been the British understanding. The Secretary said that much depended upon the composition and quality of the Lao government which might emerge.
In response to questions, Lord Home said that he expected the coalition caretaker government to prepare the way for elections. Souvanna insisted that there was a large middle bloc, which would be Lao and neutral and not communist. Souvanna believed that he would win the elections which, in accordance with the Lao constitution, must be held within five months from the setting up of the provisional government. Souvanna had been confident that he could confine Pathet Lao members in the government to two or three ministers in unimportant positions. He further thought he could eventually rule the country with his own people and could get rid of the communists in the government. Lord Home said that in view of Souvanna Phouma’s behavior in the communist capitals recently, he could not be sure how much reliance could be placed on these expectations.
The Secretary said there were two problems which must at some point come to the surface: 1) We could not participate in certifying as to the neutrality of Laos if we were not convinced that the internal arrangements would lead to a government free of communist control; and 2) if Laos were not indeed neutral, we could give no aid to it. In other words, we might find ourselves unable to sign conference agreements with which we in fact could not agree. The Secretary wondered whether Souvanna might not be so committed to the other side that he would not be influenced by the two points he had just mentioned, should they arise. Lord Home thought that it might be difficult to dispute the neutrality of a caretaker government pending elections. We would seem to have no option if the Lao agree to the government and the King approves it. However, we could of course refuse to give aid. Mr. McCloy [Page 247] said it was important, nonetheless, to analyze internal Lao strength as best we could—if the government was not strong it would of necessity have to “lean.”
In reply to the Secretary’s question, Lord Home said that Souvanna Phouma was prepared to have the French retain such military privileges as they were entitled to under the 1954 agreement. The Secretary commented that this would not be so bad if the French would take these duties seriously.
Lord Home said that if the conference did not reach a satisfactory solution, then the United Kingdom and the United States would have to face putting into operation SEATO Plan 5. We would endeavor to make it clear that communist intransigence had prevented a negotiated settlement. The Secretary said he assumed that Plan 5 would be combined with United Nations action. Lord Home agreed, saying that these actions must be simultaneous. He also thought that no one should suppose that there would be much likelihood that there would soon be a return to the conference table once the course of military intervention had been decided upon.
The discussion of Laos was concluded by Lord Home’s observation that in his view Gromyko wants to reach an arrangement for a neutral Laos.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–1461. Secret. Drafted by Jenkins and approved in S on July 1. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)↩
- See Document 41.↩