Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

112. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, June 11, 1961, 2 p.m.

Confe 175. From Harriman. Reference: Confe 152.¹

I called on Souvanna Phouma at his request June 8 shortly after his arrival. Chinese were still there but left promptly.

I had decided that all I would talk to him about was future neutrality and independence of Laos.

I started by assuring him that the US Government wanted nothing except independent, neutral Laos, and asked him what his objectives were. He said his aims were the same. How could he want Communist control, pointing to his royal birth and French background. Kong Le, Khamouane, and other anti-Communist FAL ([garble, and?]) 80 percent of population were anti-Communist. He said he believed the Soviet Union would support neutrality and independence. He didn’t reply when I asked for how long in view of Khrushchev’s boast that the whole world would be Communist one of these days.

I asked him whether he felt that he could withstand pressure of Communist party which had extraordinary organizational ability. He replied that he would have to organize a single mass-party to oppose NLHX. Anyway, he said that his brother Souphanouvong and Phoumy Vongvichit and NLHX/PL were really not Communist but rather Socialist. He considered they would be satisfied with Cambodian-style Laos.

I commented that he was asking me to believe too much in one afternoon, and expressed opinion that he and other leaders would have to be on guard to protect against Communist takeover. I agreed that it would be necessary to have a united front or party of all non-Communist groups in Laos in order to offset Communist drive.

Souvanna belittled Boun Oum and Phoumi as “nothings” with only a handful of military and other supporters. He also criticized the King, who wanted only yes-men around him. Souvanna claims he always stood up to the King when he felt he was wrong, which was why the King disliked him. He is also scornful of political parties like Bon’s, [Boun?] which consisted he claims of only his wife, and a few other close relatives. The Assembly would have to be dissolved as the deputies were an elite without grass roots, consisting of men who could afford 50,000-kip expenses.

Souvanna said he would be grateful for US assistance in a truly neutral Laos, and asked our help in forming national unity government by bringing our influence on Boun Oum, Phoumi and King. I replied that if I did, these men might ask me to use our influence with Souvanna. I said it was clear that US could not and had no intention of interfering in Lao internal affairs. I told him communism would spread unless the people were satisfied socially and economically. Therefore Laos had a job to do. In this we would be ready to help with technical and financial assistance, if the Laotian Government wanted us to do so. Earlier in the conversation I had made it plain that we were supporting the present RLG, but accepted Souvanna as an influential political figure who was bound to play important role in future of Laos.

I asked about Quinim, who was sitting in the room. I said his daughter had been cordial, but Quinim had been somewhat cool. Was he in favor of an independent Laos, as I had heard he worked closely with the NLHX. Souvanna said that I could count on Quinim’s being loyal to him and his objectives, but that Quinim was bitter as he had been badly treated by Boun Oum group.

As Krishna Menon was waiting, I left after about fifty minutes’ talk.

Comment: I did my best to gain some impression of his attitude. I found him more cordial but equally self-confident compared to my two previous meetings in New Delhi and Phnom Penh. He looked somewhat tired, which was perhaps due to his long trip. He seemed convinced that he could trust the Russians, but never referred to Chinese or Viet-Minh. He considers himself the one man to lead his country, confident that he can control the left-wingers and arouse national popular support. I left with knowing little more about him than when I came in. He gave all the right answers to my questions, accepted my rather blunt statements and my questioning attitude without resentment, and appeared to want to gain our support for the time being, at least.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–1161. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Vientiane, Bangkok, and Saigon.
1. In Confe 152, June 8, Harriman suggested a brief and nonsubstantive meeting with Souvanna for use in light of possible press inquiries. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–861)