Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

111. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on Laos⁰

Washington, June 7, 1961, 9:08 p.m.

Fecon 97. Confe 136.¹ For Harriman from Secretary.

Immediately preceding message sent to Moscow and repeated to you contains text of my message to be delivered Gromyko.² We had not contemplated higher level approach to Soviets this juncture.

Our concept here is that may now be possible bring Soviets to agree to instructions from co-Chairmen to ICC along lines contemplated London’s 107 to Geneva.³ We would therefore not wish interpose difficulties in way of expeditious Soviet agreement by publicly challenging Khrushchev’s good faith with respect Vienna joint communique.

Meanwhile believe you should continue pursue with your British and French colleagues course of postponing day-to-day further sessions of conference until Soviets agree to satisfactory co-Chairmen’s instructions to ICC. We would seek to wait out the Soviets in this manner. Continuing postponement of Conference sessions on this issue would probably bring growing pressure on Soviets to accede to our position re instructions to ICC.

Our underlying attitude for guidance your tactics is that we wish to insist upon effective cease-fire but do not wish ourselves be in position of breaking up Conference.⁴

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–761. Secret, Niact. Drafted by Usher; cleared with Anderson of SEA, Chapman, McConaughy, and William O. Anderson of SOV; and approved by the Secretary. Repeated niact to London, Moscow, and Paris, priority to Vientiane, and to Bangkok.
1. In Confe 136, June 7, Harriman reported that he and the British and French Delegation heads at Geneva had agreed to cancel that afternoon’s meeting in light of the Padong attack. They also agreed to recommend to their respective governments top-level demarches to Moscow. (Ibid.)
2. In telegram 213 to Moscow, repeated to Geneva as Fecon 96, June 7, Rusk instructed Thompson to meet with Gromyko to deliver a message from him expressing grave concern over the Padong attack which was not in keeping with the agreements on the cease-fire before the Geneva Conference nor with discussions at Vienna. The ICC must be allowed to maintain the cease-fire and investigate violations. (Ibid.)
3. The reference is apparently in error. In this telegram, June 7, the Embassy reported that the British expected recommendations from their delegate in Geneva. (Ibid.)
4. Since Gromyko left for Geneva before Thompson could deliver the message, Harriman delivered it. In Confe 166 from Geneva, June 10, Harriman reported his conversation with Gromyko in which he presented the points in Rusk’s letter and asked Gromyko how to “get the train back on the track again.” Gromyko asked when was the West going to end its “sit-down strike” at Geneva. Gromyko refused to accept that the Pathet Lao was responsible for Padong; he blamed the provocation on the Boun Oum “rebels.” Harriman disagreed and asked Gromyko why then did he not want the ICC to investigate. Gromyko said it would first have to reach an understanding with the three sides in Laos. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–1061)