Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

110. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, June 7, 1961, 9 p.m.

Confe 144. For Secretary from Harriman.

I called on Pushkin at 5:00 accompanied by Steeves and Crawford. I began with statement along following lines:

I had heard from our Ambassador in Vientiane of attacks that took place yesterday at Padong. Heavy artillery fire occurred throughout entire day as well as infantry attacks by PL, Vietnamese and Kong Le troops. As result Col Vang Pao commanding RLG forces withdrew from Padong to prepared positions. This constitutes most ruthless attack since cease-fire declaration and press reports today show world aroused by these actions of PL which can no longer be concealed. They obviously underline immediate need ICC investigation.

Moreover we cannot help but hold Soviet Government responsible because of its role in supplying PL by air with military supplies and equipment. In light of Vienna discussions and communique I assumed Khrushchev will want to take action. (I read to Pushkin what President said on Vienna discussions re Laos in his address last night.)¹ I was sure Khrushchev would have same feelings as President on question since Pravda had said today that Vienna talks could be prelude to breakdown of cold war barriers and pledged Soviet Union will do all it can to improve Soviet-American relations.

I told Pushkin I would be grateful if he would call foregoing to attention his government and expressed confidence Khrushchev would take immediate action to instruct ICC investigation on ground and to see to it that criminal attacks of PL cease. I added that he of course understood that effective cease-fire was prerequisite to our negotiations here. However, I did not want to take a negative attitude as I felt sure Khrushchev would want to take positive action.

Pushkin said he had no information on recent events in Padong. However, he regarded our information as one-sided. Souvanna Phouma’s representative had recounted history of Padong and pointed out that area had been fully under PL control and opposing paratroopers had been sent in by air only after cease-fire established. Therefore cease-fire is two-sided matter and this was what they had in mind when referring to effective cease-fire in Vienna. Furthermore he could not accept my statement that Soviet Union responsible. If Soviet Union responsible for anything in Laos, it was for effective cease-fire established since May 3. He personally knew how much effort had gone into putting stop to hostilities in face of many obstacles since he had dealt directly with these problems in Foreign Ministry. If US had shown same degree of patience it would have had great effect. He was sure my remark that Soviet Union responsible must result from misunderstanding since he was firmly convinced Soviet Union was doing everything to make cease-fire effective. He stressed in this regard they didn’t want Vienna communique to be “just a piece of paper” but something to be put into execution. Reiterating that this was two-sided question he said effective cease-fire requires end to unauthorized flights over territory of PL and Kong Le. Otherwise bad results could ensue.

I agreed this was two-way matter and this was why we were urging that ICC investigate facts. There had been allegations on both sides. Therefore, our joint instrument should be sent to investigate. We felt that this was way to settle matter between forces of PL and RLG.

Pushkin argued we can’t give to this instrument such powers that do not flow from task which faces us. Draft reply to ICC message of May 20² is now being considered in Moscow and they are “sure agreement will be reached.” As for developments in Laos, these will be clearer tomorrow when two Princes arrive at 3:40 p.m.

I agreed was good to have them come and said Phoumi was going to Nice. Pushkin said Princes might go to Nice too. I told him Phoumi had agreed with ICC to abandon air supply if PL would stop their attacks. Pushkin said this was good but there should be no reasons for any provocative actions. I said I knew too much as we had first hand information from US officers on ground that PL had been attacking for some time. Therefore ICC must go and confirm facts. I was sure Khrushchev had so agreed with President Kennedy. Pushkin agreed to report my statement.

We were told Gromyko due Geneva about 8 p.m. Thursday, June 8.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–761. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Also sent to Moscow and Vientiane and repeated to London and Paris.
1. For text of the communique issued after the meeting at Vienna, June 4, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 574. Kennedy’s address to the Nation, June 6, is ibid., pp. 574–578; for the portion on Laos, see p. 576.
2. The ICC Report of May 20, calling for establishment of a machinery to deal with the maintenance of the cease-fire, was Document 6 of the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question. (Laos/Doc/6; Department of State, L/EA Files: Lot 70 D 453)