Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

114. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Embassy in Thailand⁰

Geneva, June 16, 1961, 11 p.m.

Confe 98. In response to Department’s Fecon 129 of June 16,¹ I take this opportunity to express some thoughts on the principles upon which our efforts here in Geneva are currently being based. By frequent discussions with friendly delegates we have gained perceptible understanding on their part of this philosophy and it is submitted to addressee posts for possible consultation and discussion with the governments concerned, especially Bangkok, Saigon and Vientiane, with the request that instructions from home capitals may supplement our efforts with the delegates here in Geneva.

It certainly is clear that by choosing the conference route in attempting to achieve an acceptable independent and neutral Laos surrounded by certain safeguards, that we face certain inherent hazards. It was plain that the alternative course of escalated military action faced us with grave dangers with uncertain outcomes for all concerned. Having chosen the conference route, we must accustom ourselves to accept less than perfect solutions to each of the problems as they arise unless we are prepared to turn back to the alternative of force.

The compromise on the seating of the Lao delegates in which we arrived at the formula of “agreeing to disagree” and thus permitting the presence of opposition delegates from Laos, has not been acceptable to our Southeast Asian friends. As the conference has progressed, however, it has seemed to us here in Geneva that having made the protest over the indefensible seating arrangement, and placing the onus of recalcitrance upon our Communist opponents, we would now be better off to encourage the RLG to accept the inevitable and bring their representatives to the conference table (even if they appear only when they desire to make a statement) in order that the RLG’s view be heard on the substantive matters now coming before us. If the Zurich meeting does not result in a coalition delegation under a single acceptable spokesman, I believe it expedient to urge that an RLG delegation take its place in order that we have the advantage of its support.

With respect to the cease-fire, we could have continued to take adamant stand pressing Soviet co-chairman to comply in matter of acceptable instructions to ICC as well as to see to it that hostilities on the ground cease before consideration any other conference business. It will be recalled that our “sticking” on two separate issues thus far have resulted in two week-long recesses already. By continuing to stress as we have the need for a cease-fire and placing the onus on the Communists for breaching the cease-fire, I believe that we have succeeded in gaining world support on this issue, plus forcing them to take measures on the ground which have improved cease-fire conditions. RLG is in stronger position today to negotiate political solution than a month ago when PL were on offensive. To have pressed our point to the extreme would have gained a certain amount of condemnation from other delegates here at Geneva, especially among the neutrals. Further insistence upon complete compliance with our earlier demands would have led to a breakdown of the conference with PL takeover of Laos or resort to the alternative of force.

While we have reserved our right to bring to the conference further violations of the cease-fire, I believe that the time has come for us to address ourselves to the substantive aspects of the conference agenda, namely; control machinery, military forces limitations, neutrality declarations and possibly some discussion and understanding upon economic aid to Laos. In these discussions we shall need all of the friendly support that we can muster. The Thais and the Vietnamese have thus far spoken eloquently at the conference table. I earnestly hope that we can have the Thai presence again next week as we delve into these problems. Without them we would be isolated from Asian support. Although now we have French and British with us the situation would be comparable to our first difficult week. As I have said earlier in this message, I further hope that RLG spokesmen can be present to present their viewpoint. The Communists will attempt to make a great deal out of their position that control machinery has inherent in it an infringement on sovereignty. This is an obvious effort to create a situation in which they can continue to have a free hand at illegitimate activities under Vietminh aegis. We need the support of the friendly RLG and Vietnam, hopefully supported by the Cambodians, which can effectively give the lie to the concept that controls mean an abridgement of sovereignty. Unfortunately, the Indians have been very unhelpful.

With painstaking and patient effort I believe that we may be able to turn the activities of this conference to our advantage and to the achievement of a status for Laos with which friendly governments can live, providing of course a reasonable balanced government of national unity is agreed to. I want to stress, however, that it will take a lot of cooperation and a willingness at times to deviate from rigid concepts which the course of this conference has proven to be impractical.

Any reaction which our Ambassadors may want to pass on from their host governments plus personal opinion and guidance will be much appreciated here.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–1661. Secret. Sent also to Saigon and Vientiane; repeated to Rangoon, New Delhi, London, Paris, Phnom Penh, and the Department of State as Confe 205. The source text is the Department of State copy.
1. In Fecon 129, the Department suggested, inter alia, that the Delegation send a guidance message to Bangkok, Saigon, and Vientiane setting forth conference tactics so U.S. Ambassadors could support delegation policy at Geneva with their respective governments. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–1561)
2. In Fecon 162, June 23, Rusk agreed with Harriman’s analysis, but expressed concern about Thai and South Vietnamese attitudes and the U.S. ability to keep them at the conference. Rusk also noted that there might come a point when the United States would have to end the conference without signing unsatisfactory agreements. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–1661)