Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

259. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, May 4, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Cary Report on ROK Force Levels¹

This is a fascinating document. The Cary group agrees that “Option A” (a six division cut) is militarily reasonable if some sanction exists to keep Communist China from attacking the ROK and that this sanction does exist in the form of US [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] forces in the area (pp. 36 and 56).² Indeed, it says that if such a cut had been made at the time of withdrawal of ChiCom forces from Korea, it would have been advantageous, and might again be feasible in the future if events provide some similar justification.

However, the report opposes such a cut at present, primarily, because it would upset Pak’s regime and secondarily because it would have adverse repercussions on US allies throughout East Asia, who would see in it a reduced US interest in their defense as well. The main argument seems to be that the Pak regime would naturally be quite upset by a major cut in its main base of support, the Army. Great political instability might ensue. Thus the Cary Report seems to make its case against a force cut not on military grounds but on the grounds that it would have political repercussions undermining ROK political (and by extension) economic stability.

This conclusion seems contestable on three grounds:

(1) It is supported primarily by some rather scary speculation. I am not persuaded that a 135,000 man cut over three years, leaving ROK forces at a still sizable 460,000, would create such dire risks. The new SNIE (42-62) seems to take a less gloomy view of these repercussions, although not minimizing them. But the SNIE concludes that the Pak regime would accept a force cut if pressed, and if adequate US reassurances were given. Indeed, no one has assessed whether Pak himself might not prefer a force cut if the hwan released plus dollars saved could be used to support his new five year plan. It might be interesting to put this proposition up to General Pak. Moreover, are we sure that a force cut would be so politically unpopular as to promote instability, rather than the reverse? Recall that Chang Myon campaigned in 1960 on a platform of reducing the ROK army by 200,000 men, and got elected. Then he attempted to press a 100,000 man force cut; the opposition was from the US, not the ROK. Finally in December 1960 the US agreed to a T/O cut from 630,000 to 600,000. I also recall seeing a paper written by General Chung Il-Kwon, three times ROK Chief of Staff, in which he too argued for a much smaller ROK army. The initiation of a major development program along the lines suggested by Pak might be the dramatic and significant event which the Cary group says would be necessary to justify a force cut.

(2) While the Cary Report devotes some attention to the subversive threat, it makes no analysis of the comparative seriousness of internal and external threats which is the guts of the problem. The Steering Group argued (based on NIE 14.2/42-61)³ that the greatest threats to the security and stability of South Korea were not overt attack but domestic weaknesses which would be politically exploited by the NK Communists.⁴ Therefore, while recognizing that an external threat still existed, it argued for reducing somewhat our insurance against this contingency in order to back adequately an intensified development effort. The new SNIE (42-62) bears out this need. In effect, we face a necessity for choice in Korea between two legitimately competing views.

(3) My third reservation applies to the economic argument. The Report makes much of the limited capacity of the ROK economy to absorb new outside capital. Maybe so, but it also emphasizes the constant ROK problem of avoiding large government deficits which create inflation. It notes that to do so will require either substantial hwan diversions from the military budget or substantial reductions in government investment for economic development below the level projected in the five year plan (p. 18). Thus we do have a real competition for resources. Incidentally, the report dismisses the argument that force cuts would seriously complicate the unemployment problem by pointing out that to add 135,000 to 2.7 million already unemployed, would not be an economic catastrophe (p. 52).

It is also notable that the military analysis indicates that Communist air superiority would be of very short duration in any conflict (p. 42). Indeed, by employing US forces available in the theatre we could build up to an 800-plane offensive air strength by D plus 8. Of course, this is based on providing the ROK air defenses called for in current MAP planning.

The Report simply dismisses the likelihood of a successful NK attack against even a 12-division force (pp. 45-46). Thus the real military issue is whether we want to maintain the present much larger ROK force against the contingency of a combined ChiCom/NK attack. Is this remote contingency sufficient military rationale for the present ROK force structure? [5 lines of source text not declassified]

In sum, therefore, the Cary Report can be read as justification for a six division cut in ROK forces unless the political repercussions are too great. This is a question of judgment, on which the Cary group’s pronouncements do not seem to me to be particularly compelling and on which other judgments exist (e.g. those in the NIEs and those of State in endorsing the Steering Group Report last year).

R.W. Komer⁵

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 3/62-7/62. Top Secret.
1. For extracts, see the attachment to Document 258.
2. The new SNIE 42-62 also concludes that a one-third reduction in ROK forces “would probably not in itself increase the likelihood of invasion from the north,” although some military members of the USIB take a more alarmist view. [Footnote in the source text. SNIE 42-62 is printed in part as Document 253.]
3. Printed in part as Document 243.
4. In the report of the Military Assistance Steering Group; see Document 251.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.