Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

243. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 14.2/42-61

Washington, September 7, 1961.

THE OUTLOOK FOR KOREA

The Problem

To estimate the major trends and prospects in South Korea, with particular attention to the impact of North Korea on the south over the next two or three years.

Conclusions

1. In its push to unify Korea under Communist control, the North Korean regime will continue to depend primarily on subversive tactics and propaganda appealing to nationalistic sentiments and stressing the economic benefits of unification. Although these efforts have had little effect, the Communists probably believe their longer term prospects for a favorable response to its unification appeals are good and improving. In view of this and the automatic involvement of US forces in any resumption of hostilities in Korea, we believe the Communists are not likely to assume the grave risks of armed action against South Korea over the next several years. (Paras. 12-25, 50-53)

2. The greatest threat to South Korea, at least in the near term, comes from within South Korea. The country lacks a sense of national purpose and faces both tremendous economic problems and a brittle political situation. The military junta seeks to provide the drive and stability which was lacking in the previous civilian government but is subject to internal factionalism and lacks general public support in confronting these enormous problems. (Paras. 28-38, 54)

3. The prospect for South Korea over the next few years is therefore very cloudy and uncertain. US aid will probably succeed in preventing economic collapse. However, even under the most favorable circumstances, progress will be slow and South Korea will continue to require large-scale foreign aid for the indefinite future if it is to remain an independent nation allied with the West. (Paras. 39-42, 55)

4. The political situation is subject to sudden and rapid change. Much depends on future actions of the junta, in particular, on its capacity to establish a sense of forward momentum among the Korean people. If the overall situation in South Korea fails to improve significantly and the people lose hope for national progress, the continued enticements offered by the North Korean regime could lead to some movement in the south toward an accommodation with the north. (Paras. 23-33, 56)

[Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.]

0. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with this estimate on September 7 except the representatives of the AEC and the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.